Background

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: For such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man both to believe lyes, and tell them: and sometimes also to invent them.

Thomas Hobbes (1651)

In 1970, the United States federal government passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) to address the increasing degradation of urban air quality. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created under the CAA to enforce the Act primarily through a ``command and control'' process that set increasingly more stringent emission limits on pollution sources (Griffin 1994: 276). Two major strategies were pursued to control the increasingly serious air pollution problems created by the growing number of motor vehicles in use in urban areas.

One strategy was to establish strict emission certification standards for new vehicles. Meeting these standards placed a substantial economic burden on manufacturers and their customers.1 Certification standards did, however, provide a level playing field by requiring similar efforts from competing manufacturers. This strategy was successful. Less than three decades later, dependable catalytic converters, fuel injection, computer-controlled engines, and sophisticated diagnostic devices have cut new car emissions by over 90 percent,2 requiring little or no maintenance.3

The second strategy was to make vehicle emissions subject to inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs in regions not meeting national standards of ambient air quality for carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) or ground-level ozone, pollutants linked to motor vehicles. Inspection and maintenance programs require that all the light-duty vehicles in the area must undergo a brief scheduled test--the inspection--that is supposed to identify those vehicles that have mechanical faults causing excessive emissions. The owners of failed vehicles are then required by law to have them repaired-the maintenance--and the efficacy of the repair is subject to another inspection. I/M programs are targeted almost exclusively at cars and light trucks owned by consumers. Under 1990 amendments to the United States Clean Air Act, 179 cities in 38 states were required to implement I/M programs (US EPA 1995: s. 3, 2).

For some companies, the legal requirement for millions of annual I/M tests was very profitable. Unlike many pollution reduction programs, I/M programs do not increase the production costs of special interest groups but rather creates an entirely new source of business income for them. In the United States, a billion-dollar emissions-testing industry grew from nothing. A small number of companies specializing in designing and evaluating I/M programs for governments also sprang up. I/M legislation generated millions of additional customers for the vehicle repair shops and, depending upon the program design, provided them with guaranteed revenue from testing fees. I/M programs also expanded the market for expensive test equipment.

At the same time, I/M programs do not interfere with the interests of other politically and economically powerful groups. For example, conventional I/M legislation does not apply to the heavy trucks and buses owned by governments and large companies. It does not impose additional investment costs on the oil industry for cleaner fuels or delivery systems and, because I/M programs mostly affect older vehicles that are no longer under warranty,4 there is no adverse effect upon auto manufacturers. In general, I/M programs allow these industries to adopt a ``green'' public image at no c