In theory, this sounds simple. In practice, it could be simple if individual fishermen were told directly how much of the total catch they were allowed to take before going out on the fishing grounds. Instead, DFO managers actually confound fishers by indirectly trying to control their catch. They tell fishermen where they can fish, how long they can fish, and what gear they are allowed to use. This command-and-control approach has produced a complex, cumbersome system of regulations that makes fishing costly, clumsy, and abusive of conservation targets.

The failure of management-by-increased-regulation

In the roe herring fishery, management-by-increased-regulat-ion has been practiced since 1974 when entry into the fishery was limited to those who obtained licences that year. Since limited entry, regulations designed to control the amount of fish caught have accumulated at an astounding rate. They now include restrictions on net length, mesh size, shorter seasons (15 minute openings have occured in the seine sector), and area restrictions. In 1994, fisheries managers added even more restrictions by requiring fishers to have more than one license to fish in a given area. Today, double licensing is required in four of the five herring fishing areas. [Requiring fishers to have more than one license to fish in an area is called double, triple, or quadruple licensing. It is another way of limiting the effort that goes into fishing as it reduces the number of boats eligible to fish in each opening.]

The most telling evidence of regulatory failure in the roe herring and other fisheries has been the frequently tragic race for the fish. The race occurs as fishermen compete to catch as many fish as possible as quickly as possible in order to establish ownership. As fishermen get more inventive in the face of regulations designed to control their fishing power, bureaucrats must implement new, more intricate controls. In the roe herring fishery, as in other fisheries managed this way, the result has been shorter more intense fishing seasons in smaller areas. This, in turn, means that fishing is less safe and less profitable.

One of the worst problems with the management-by-increased-regulation model is that it becomes almost impossible to determine whether conservation targets are met until after the fishery is closed—when it is too late to adjust the level of the catch. In the herring fishery, the coast-wide total allowable catch has been exceeded every year since 1989. This year, target catches were exceeded in all but one of the herring openings and on the central coast, seine boats exceeded their target catch by over 100% (table 1). In effect, current management has failed in its efforts to accomplish its most important duty—ensuring that target catches are not exceeded so that future stocks are kept healthy.

Conservation failure is not the only problem in fisheries managed by increasing regulation. The short, intense fishing seasons lead to serious economic inefficiencies. First, fishing is more costly because fishermen must use powerful boats and equipment to compete with each other in order to establish ownership of the resource. This concentrated fishing power is wasteful because it does not increase the total amount of fish caught, it simply increases one's chances of catching fish before another fisherman gets them.

In addition, short intense fishing seasons mean lower product quality. Fishermen must harvest the fish quickly, therefore they do not have time to be selective and take only the most valuable fish (large females, in the case of the roe herring fishery). Further, once the fish are caught, they are not handled carefully. There is no time to make sure the fish are not crushed, and they are often stepped on and left unrefriger-ated. One fishermen estimated that if fish could be handled more carefully, quality would increase returns to fishers by between 30 and 50 percent.

The short openings also create a problem for processors. This year, the number of fish landed in a short time period exceeded the processors' abilities to transport and process the fish. Reportedly, fish was trucked as far south as Portland to be frozen. Tons of the 1997 catch rotted while in the queue to be processed. By the time the fish reached the plants, as much as 20 percent was suitable only for reduction to make fertilizer and cat food. According to a roe herring fishermen, this "is criminal because the stuff is gold."

Fishermen pay for this inefficient management and so do taxpayers. Perhaps surprisingly, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans does not keep track of how much it costs to manage the herring fishery. However, given the eight months of planning as well as the on-the-ground monitoring involving helicopters, numerous surface vessels, and fisheries officers to administer the fishery and monitor the catch, it is very likely that the management of roe herring is heavily subsidized by taxpayers. This situation is unacceptable.

Keeping the herring fishery healthy

Department of Fisheries and Oceans managers, no longer able to ignore these serious problems, are currently considering changes for the 1998 roe herring fishery. The main goal of the change in management is to ensure that area target catch levels are not exceeded. Incredibly, many of the options that they propose, such as further gear and time restrictions, and triple or quadruple licensing, do not address the fundamental problems in the fishery. Which leads to the question: Whose interests are really being served by increased regulation?

Fortunately, one of the options currently being considered does promise a solution. Individual quotas (IQs), which give individual fishermen a share of the total fish catch before they go out on the fishing grounds, completely realigns the incentives in the fishery. IQs remove the incentive to catch as many fish as possible in as short a time period as possible. This, in turn, means that fishing costs decrease and product quality increases. A more lucrative fishery means that fishermen will be able to pay for their own management. Indeed, granting fishermen rights to the harvest before it is caught allows them to have more control over where, how, and when they fish. Stronger rights in the fishery make fishermen demand more accountability from their managers. In addition, eliminating the race for the fish means that conservation goals are more easily met. Catch limits are never exceeded in other fisheries in BC managed under IQs.

To continue managing the roe herring fishery under increasing regulation when there is clearly a better alternative is completely ludicrous. As one fisherman indicated, "you would be hard pressed to come up with a worse system if you tried." Let's hope that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans remembers that as managers, their goals include conservation and economic viability. Since individual quotas are the best way to achieve those goals, let's hope they choose the only option that makes sense. Isn't it about time to implement some sensible fisheries policy?