"Hell hath no fury like a vested interest masquerading as a moral principle."-Dorothy Parker

Overview

When a public policy persists for several decades and it has become more elaborate over time, it is reasonable to assume that politicians are aware of the full range of its consequences.⁴¹ In the case of broadcasting policy, there have been at least a dozen official studies since the Aird Commission of 1929, and vastly more studies by academics and others. Canadian content regulations have been subject to considerable scrutiny and comment. Given such information, and the insights gleaned from periodic public opinion polls (some cited below), it is reasonable to infer that Canadian content regulations meet the needs of the politicians in a position to change them. Yet both Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments have expanded these regulations (appendix A). Thus Canadian content regulations meet a basic political litmus test, regardless of the critiques offered by some economists, policy analysts, and others.

I can't offer a simple, neat explanation why CanCon regulations are so apparently well rooted in Canada's political firmament. It appears to be based on a combination of factors-from a certain kind of idealism to crass economic advantage.

Public support: some evidence from the polls and viewing patterns

There is polling evidence indicating considerable public support for CanCon regulations. There is also evidence that English-speaking Canadians prefer American-produced TV programs to CanCon. For example, the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting commissioned Compas Inc. of Toronto to conduct a poll of 1,205 Canadian adults between August 26 and September 4, 1995. When it was suggested that increased competition in the cable TV market might result in lower rates, but less investment in Canadian programming, "52 percent of respondents said the potential harm to Canadian programming outweighs the benefits of lower prices, while 38 percent put lower prices ahead of Canadian content. Ten percent offered no opinion" (Globe and Mail, October 2, 1995, p. A1). Asked whether the distributors of TV programs should be required to contribute 10 percent of their revenues to the production of Canadian content, 42 percent of respondents said it was too little, 42 percent said it was about right, while 9 percent said it was too much. Forty-four percent said they support the rule requiring that one-half the schedule in prime time be Canadian television shows. In January 1993, 39 percent said the amount of required Canadian programming was "about right," while 55 percent said it was too little.

More generally, a paper prepared for the ADM's Policy Research Committee (1996, p. 5) states that

Despite increasing access to content from multiple sources, polling data indicates that the availability of high-quality Canadian cultural products is important to Canadians (Goldfarb Report, 1996). Polling data from 1987 to the present consistently shows that over 60 percent of Canadians believe our culture and identity should be reflected by our cultural products (Goldfarb, 1995), and a majority of Canadians (52%) say that the nation's culture should be protected from foreign influence. (Environics, 1995)

The Information Highway Advisory Council (1997, ch. 5) cites other polls with similar results. Thus the polling data suggests that there is majority support for CanCon and protectionist cultural policies, but it appears that only one poll suggested to respondents that such policies have costs borne by the public.

Turning now to the type of programs people actually watch on television, we find that the preference for foreign versus domestic television programs varies greatly by language of the viewer. In 1995, anglophones spent 72 percent of their viewing time watching foreign-made programs while francophones spent 67 percent of their viewing time watching Canadian programs. While the two language groups spent about one-third of their viewing time watching comedy and drama, anglophones watched mainly foreign pro<%-2>ductions (95 percent) while francophones watched<%0> more Canadian shows in this category (60%) (Globe and Mail, July 26, 1996, pp. A10, A11). The 1996 data indicate that Francophone viewers spent close to 70 percent of viewing time watching domestic programs, versus 30 percent for anglophones ... (Canadian Press, 1998). Table 6 indicates that in 1991/92, CanCon accounted for 32.0 percent of English TV viewing and 69.8 percent of French TV viewing. The figures for 1996/97 were 31.7 percent and 68.9 percent respectively (from CAB, 1998d). As mentioned earlier, for francophones, language constitutes a natural barrier to US, or other foreign programs broadcast in English.

Symbolism and other explanations

Several explanations for these incongruous facts come to mind. First, English-speaking Canadians are simply being hypocritical. They espouse CanCon in principle, but in the privacy of their homes they prefer to watch foreign (primarily US) programs. Of course, hypocrisy if fairly common both in everyday life (for example, some of those who support family values also commit adultery), and in public policy (Canada supports trade liberalization, but makes great efforts to protect supply management marketing boards and cultural industries).

Second, Canadians may value their viewing of Canadian TV programs more than their viewing of foreign programs. ⁴²

Third, and probably most important, CanCon may be an evocative political symbol. By definition, a symbol stands for something larger and more complex than itself. It is like a cryptic code, but one rich in emotive properties. The meanings of a symbol can be as complex and metaphorical as a dream. Effective symbols are powerful but "fuzzy" in the sense that they have the power to move many people, in part because they can read different things into the symbol-but not so varied as to create contradictions for the majority of observers.

It appears that CanCon regulations appeal to different groups on different levels. For "soft nationalists," CanCon could be seen as contributing to "national identity" and "cultural sovereignty" per the Broadcasting Act. The fact that the terms have never been defined does not lessen their appeal. CanCon could simply be deemed to be a "good thing." Soft nationalists are comfortable too because there certainly appears to be an abundance of choice of television programs-in particular, the most popular shows in the US are available in Canada. Further, it makes some hearts swell with pride when Heritage Canada or the head of the CTRC claims that many Canadian pop recording artists are big successes in Canada and abroad because of the CanCon rules, or that Canada is now the world's second largest exporter of TV programs (see CAB, 1998d).

Finally, for the many Canadians who enjoy American TV programs or pop music on the radio, the CanCon quotas might well represent a sort of "sin tax" (like those on liquor and tobacco). American cultural products are supposed to be bad for you (at least according to the cultural elite, nationalists, and suppliers of CanCon), so one must pay the high taxes and restriction on choices associated with the consumption of sinful products. Although what it regulates are largely the artifacts of "pop culture," the CRTC does so with the solemnity and portentousness of Richard Wagner. For example, Canadian television, said a member of the CRTC, is not about entertainment. That is the American way. She said that the point of TV in Canada is to enhance national identity (Allemang, 1998a, p. A19). "If the commission had its way, every night would be Cultural Sovereignty night, and God forbid a Canadian producer should take an interest in the outside world." (Allemang, 1998a, p. A19).

CanCon as part of national differentiation efforts

Differentiation of Canada in various ways, primarily from the United States, is in the interests of the political and cultural elites. CanCon is part of the differentiation efforts. "Nationalism requires the maintenance of difference from proximate communities" (Collins, 1990, p. 262). In general, these elites would be far less powerful and have fewer outlets for their cultural products if Canada as a nation disappears, by becoming part of the US, for example. Note that these elites can also gain from the creation of protectionist policies even if the threat to loss of sovereignty is entirely fictitious.

The whole point of differentiation is to (1) stress the uniqueness of being Canadian (largely in terms of not being American), (2) increase east-west psychological ties (to offset the pulls for closer relations with the US), (3) provide support for the idea that Canada embodies distinctive values, (4) persuade people that being different in some sense is good-no matter how much it costs ⁴³ (although considerable effort is made to }disguise the costs of differentiation), and (5) }reinforce the position of the present elites (who advocate public policies which promote differentiation, including Canadian content regulations).⁴⁴ It can be argued that Canadian content policies are consistent with these objectives.

Philosopher Thomas Hurka (1996) argues that, for many Canadians, nationalism rests on what they believe are "distinctively Canadian qualities,"⁴⁵ rather than a shared history. Often distinctiveness is based on an effort to differentiate aspects of Canada from the US. He asks, "would medicare matter less if the US had it too?" For Hurka (1996), "it's a mistake to tie Canadian nationalism to distinctively Canadian qualities. And it is a harmful mistake that has had destructive effects on our national life."⁴⁶ The implication is that Canada only has a reason to exist if it is different from the US. But in what ways?

Hurka (1996) suggests that "the distinctiveness fetish has corrupted Canadian politics, offering an all-purpose counter to any proposal" that will lead to the Americanization of Canada. It is a powerful reason for those who believe that what is American is "bad." The fetish for distinctiveness has also corrupted the arts.

[It] often assumes the point of Canadian art is to express what is distinctively Canadian. But how does a classical violinist play Beethoven in a distinctively Canadian way? And it's even more constricting when applied to literature. There are uniquely Canadian experiences, and literature that captures them can be as great as any literature anywhere. But there are also universal experiences, such as falling in love, aging, and death. Writing exploring those experiences can likewise be great; if it's by a Canadian, that makes it ours. (Hurka, 1996, p. D5)

Richard Collins (1990, p. 261) notes that "Canadian nationalists' advocacy of Canadian national culture and hostility to the influence of the United States is an ethical judgment that Canadian culture and its artifacts are morally superior." This reinforces the distinctiveness fetish.

The elite versus the masses

Richard Collins (1990, p. 33) argues that "the role of nationalist elites in Canada have been of enormous importance in the evolution of Canada's television policies, and that these policies have been less than optimal because of the assumptions and interests of these elites."

The earliest efforts to promote the creation of a public national broadcasting agency and government regulation of broadcasting in 1932 were led by two members of the elite (Alan Plaunt and Graham Spry ⁴⁷) and focused on gaining the support of the economic, political and cultural elite (see Nash, 1995). In particular, the cultural elite has been closely associated with the evolution of Canada's broadcasting policy, emphasizing the importance of high culture, education, and opportunities for Canadian artists and others deemed deserving of the opportunity to put their worth/views before radio listeners and TV viewers. For those who find the nationalist and cultural objectives insufficient or unappealing, officials and politicians now provide an economic justification in terms of industrial policy (recall section 6 above.)

There has always been a conflict between the (self-appointed) aesthetic elite in cultural matters and those who want the electronic media to emphasize popular culture. Collins (1990, p. 51) argues that Canada's broadcasting policy is aimed at "redirecting audience desires" and that audience taste [for U.S. programs and pop culture] is conceived as the problem." A recent editorial put the matter this way: "The demand for more CanCon is thus a classic example of a tiny, connected elite trying to force Canadians to swallow what it thinks is good for them." (Ottawa Citizen, December 8, 1997).

The elite view of protecting Canadian culture was well articulated by Bernard Ostry when he left the post of head of TV Ontario: "Even at the tables of the culturally richest nations, the mass of cheap mental junk food kills the appetite for home cooked nourishment: The chatter of cleverly bland time killers drowns out the still, sad music of humanity" (quoted in Martin, 1993, p. 186). Another example is provided by William Thorsell, editor of the Globe and Mail, who argues that "we are drowning and gagging and sputtering in a morass of cultural mediocrity that is honoured as the best North America can provide." American cultural products are "rooted in the rampant superficiality of their own time and place." They are "ruined by the deadly provincialism that attends any monopoly of power, infantilized by wealth, adolescently arrested by a simplistic ideology of individualism, and blinded by narcissism." (Quoted in Martin, 1993, p. 186).

The cultural elite has at least two problems. First, the Canadian "masses" prefer cultural junk food (popular culture) to high culture. Second, the junk food they like best is made in the US, and a majority of English-speaking Canadians devote most of their TV viewing to US programs and would likely consume more if it were not for the CanCon rules. The problem, then, is one of taste. The masses' tastes are not those of the elite, and the elite is highly frustrated by this fact.

The elite is not content to indulge its own tastes; it wants to "improve" the tastes of others. The elite know to a certainty that if they could fully determine the type of cultural products to which the masses are exposed and to increase their exposure to these products, the masses would, in time, come to demand the cultural products promoted by the elite. For the Canadian cultural elite, US junk food is positively the worst kind, because it is the product of the nation they love to hate. Worst of all, it is popular around the world and so further isolates and frustrates the elite.⁴⁸

Regulatory capture and rent-seeking

Rent seeking is a term used by economists to refer to the expenditure of money and effort to influence public policy for the economic advantage (increased income and/or wealth, or reduced risk) of the individuals or organizations lobbying government. Successful rent-seeking has three main effects: (1) it results in implicit or explicit income transfers from other citizens to the beneficiaries of the change in public policy; (2) there is a dead weight loss for society as a whole because scarce resources are used to gain and retain the income transfers; and (3) it encourages others to organize and try to do the same thing-this exacerbates the waste of resources for an activity which does not create any new wealth.

Today, probably the best single explanation for the persistence, extension, and "refinement" of the Canadian content regulations is rent-seeking by the groups of people who individually have a large direct pecuniary interest in the policy.⁴⁹ While they may not have originated the policy, they have effectively "captured" both the officials in Heritage Canada who promote it, and CRTC which implements it under the Broadcasting Act.⁵⁰ In this case, "capture" was not difficult because cultural nationalists fill many of the government jobs dealing with the policy. Indeed, one might argue that Canadian content regulations provide "psychological rents" for the cultural nationalists both in and out of government.

The legal definitions of a "Canadian program" for TV and "Canadian musical selection" for radio strongly imply that the real objective is to increase the incomes of certain Canadian citizens, and to expand the diffusion of two types of cultural products produced by Canadian citizens. Substantive or thematic content is not regulated.⁵¹ The requirement that a certain percentage of CanCon TV programs be made by independent Canadian production companies reflects lobbying by those companies to get a greater share of the implicit or explicit income transfers created in the name of Canadian content.

It is clear that the industrial strategy rationale for CanCon regulations is now at least as important in Ottawa as promoting "national identity" and "cultural sovereignty." The industrial strategy rationale emphasizes how much economy activity, particularly income flows, is "created" by the policy.⁵² This makes it clearer to the public that this is just another subsidy program for politically effective groups (see Coyne, 1998). Now, the CAB no longer opposes CanCon regulations as it did when they were introduced (see Hardin, 1985). Indeed, it endorses the ill-defined objectives in the Broadcasting Act, and it focuses on making changes in them which will make them less burdensome or which will generate economic benefits for broadcasters.

Tacit anti-Americanism

Richard Gwyn (1995, p. 51) notes that "a sizable number of intellectuals, artists, and members of the political elite have harboured ... plain and simple anti-Americanism, even while denying it."⁵³ It is often expressed indirectly, by comments on the millions without medical insurance, the extent of violence, and American chauvinism. For tacit or overt anti-Americans, CanCon regulations have the virtue of restricting the volume of US TV programming or pop music available in Canada over the airwaves. The regulations amount to a thumb in the eye for Americans.

Henighan (1996, p. 55) attributes "acerbic Yankee baiting" by some Canadian intellectuals to their "awareness of their colonized mentalities" and their resentment of it (p. 55). American entertainment products contain a "particular mix of megalomania, violence, and innocence" (p. 55). Imagine his reaction if Canada's entertainment culture was characterized in such simplistic and distorted terms, say insecure, derivative, and envious!

A major part of the rhetoric of cultural nationalists plays upon the fears of the insecure by "trashing" the alternatives. For example, Rick Salutin (a prominent left-wing nationalist) argues that Canadians' access to American culture "underlies one of the great strengths of our own," namely Canadians', "critiques of American (also known as international) culture." He referred to SCTV's parodies, Codco, parts of Saturday Night Live, and Leonard Cohen's songs and poems about the US. He assures us that "reaction can be creative too" (Globe and Mail, March 3, 1995, p. A12). Threats to Canada's web of cultural protectionism are responded to with apocalyptic scenarios. For example, Peter Newman (1997, p. 56) has said that broadcast signals from the US are "threatening to destroy our culture." He contends that "commercial US television ... is fun to view, but a steady diet not only blunts intuitions, homogenizes feelings, and eradicates subtleties, it makes us forget who we are and why we are here." Further, Newman contends that "Canadian culture is a far more subtle and fragile commodity" than its American counterpart, which "is their most successful export."

According to the prominent cultural nationalist Herschel Hardin (1985, p. 35), "the main stated function of the CRTC ... [is] to ensure that television and radio programming in Canada was as Canadian, diverse, and original as possible, and not American." Here Hardin shows his true anti-American colours. There is nothing in the Broadcasting Act saying that radio and TV programs are not to be American. This is the nationalists' phobia being "written into" an important statute. Notice that what Hardin is implying is that the last characteristic ("not American") is the most important. Apparently America is the cultural "evil empire." But why must the rest of us pay for Hardin's "fear and loathing" of American TV programs?

For the Globe and Mail's former TV critic, John Haslett Cuff (1996), the culture of American television is "smarmy and offensive" because it is centred on commercials. He said, "I hate most of these commercials and the products and values they represent.... They are single-handedly responsible for corrupting our children and subverting whatever remnants of `Canadian' values are still resident somewhere `out there' more than any other aspect of television."

Subtle anti-Americanism can be seen in a recent change in policy by the CBC. Beginning in the fall of 1996, all regularly scheduled US programming was removed from English language TV between 7:00 and 11:00 p.m. ⁵⁴ According to newspaper reports at the time of the announcement, CBC replaced the US programs with Canadian shows and some non-American foreign productions.⁵⁵ In other words, the problem was with American programs, not all foreign programs.

Closely related to tacit anti-Americanism is the fear of "cultural swamping" by US-made cultural products, particularly TV programs. This is not a new fear. It was a driving force behind the Canadian Radio League's lobbying efforts in 1930-1932 to establish a national public broadcaster (see Nash, 1995). The fear was that if American radio programs continued to be the most popular with Canadians, the result would be "cultural annexation" by the US.

Perhaps the high (low?) point in this type of demagoguery was reached in 1977 when the president of the CBC, a former deputy minister, described the voluntary importation of American TV programs as "cultural rape."⁵⁶ More recently, Prof. Tom Henighan (1996, p. 47) argues that "we are heading for a universal entertainment culture, one that transcends national boundaries and more and more destroys the possibility of individuality and local self-expression. [Further], most of the world's entertainment culture promises to be of American origin, or to imitate American-style products. [Also], this entertainment culture promotes certain values and attitudes, some of which are intimately related to American ideas, presumptions, national paradigms, and myths. [Finally], this homogenous entertainment culture -though far from `evil'-has negative effects on society."

The "cultural swamping" theme is alive and well in Ottawa. It was recently expressed by Heritage Minister Sheila Copps as follows:

We appreciate the best that Hollywood has to offer ... but in Canada we also know that culture is more than entertainment. In a globalized marketplace, in an era of rapid technological change, Canadians have acted and will act to address our interests and to ensure Canadians have access to Canadian culture. After all, culture is what makes life worth living. (Southam Newspapers, 1998, p. A3)

For the true blue, cultural nationalist, popular American-made TV programs are at least as objectionable as kiddie porn. They have no socially redeeming value. The practical problem is that about 68 percent of the TV viewed by English Canadians is of foreign-made programs. They manage to do this in spite of the elaborate restrictions imposed by the CRTC.

Finally, columnist Andrew Coyne points out the glaring internal contradiction in the cultural swamping argument

The whole point of cultural nationalism, the whole reason for the protection, is supposed to be that Canadians and Americans are not the same; that American magazines [or TV and radio programs] cannot speak to Canadian interests, tastes, and values in quite the same way. Canadian publishers [broadcasters] accordingly, have nothing to worry about. (Coyne 1996b, p. A15)

Thus, Coyne argues that simply because they are not made by Canadians and for Canadians, American cultural products, by definition, cannot have the same resonance with Canadians. Thus Canadian-made cultural products are so totally differentiated from apparently similar US-made products that Canadians cannot substitute the foreign for the domestic product. Therefore, protectionist regulation is unnecessary.

The politics of CanCon-a synthesis

In this section I try to explain why the elaborate set of Canadian content regulations have persisted and have been expanded as noted in appendix A.

1. CanCon regulations benefit from the proposition of "the importance of being unimportant." The costs of the regulations are not so large or visible so as to provoke concerted opposition. (A similar phenomenon helps to explain why farmers receive so much help from government in so many ways.)

2. The opponents of CanCon regulations are not organized or vocal. There are fundamental economic reasons why this is so (specifically, the high costs of organizing such a dispersed group; and the fact that those who stand to benefit from lobbying against the policy can "free ride"). See Stanbury (1993).

3. The largest economic beneficiaries of CanCon are organized, vocal, and clever at using various media to get their message to policy makers and to the public. Moreover, they benefit hugely from the "culture of celebrity" (see Mallet, 1998). The beneficiaries shamelessly use their "star power" to promote the Canadian content policy (except in a few cases where Canada is no longer an important market for their wares).

4. Canadian content regulations have an inchoate emotional appeal for "soft nationalists" who support it, but do not feel unduly disadvantaged by it. The data indicate that 68 percent of the time English Canadians spend watching TV is watching foreign (largely US) content. In other words, they can support CanCon regulations in principle, while continuing to watch US shows.

5. Opponents can be easily marginalized by the proponents of the policy by being portrayed as cultural philistines, Americans in disguise, and therefore not "true Canadians." They can be described as promoting the takeover of Canada by the US, or simply as disgruntled individuals who do not appreciate the virtues of the "Canadian way." Criticism of CanCon provokes a reaction much like that of a female bear who believes her cubs are threatened.

6. The public has, over the decades, become used to (and accepting of) the arguments for protectionism advanced by the proponents of CanCon regulations. (For an excellent example, see Roch, 1998.) The desire to create jobs and increase exports is strong, while the costs are largely hidden. In general, the nationalist aims are seen as worthy. (As one of my students put it, "If we don't subsidize Canadian content, how will broadcasters ever make any money?")

7.Over the years, the Canadian content regulations have created jobs for many public officials who administer them. They represent a strong, if nearly invisible, claque for the maintenance or expansion of the policy as it gives them a larger domain over which to exercise influence (or real power, in some cases).

8. Over the years, the federal cultural policy agencies and cultural institutions have become disproportionately led by and operated by francophones. It appears that, by and large, francophones in the bureaucracy are supportive of greater government intervention in the name of protecting and supporting cultural activities. Within Quebec, government assistance for and regulation of culture is seen as critical to the maintenance of Quebec's unique identity (some say as a "nation"). The French language acts as a natural barrier against the import of US (or UK, or Australian) cultural products. There is an irony here. CanCon quotas for TV programs very rarely create a binding constraint in Quebec because of the natural language barrier (see table 5).

9. The combination of rent-seeking and appeals to nationalism (whether "fuzzy" or xenophobic) creates a more powerful appeal than the simple addition of the two. It is common for rent-seekers of all types to "wrap themselves in the flag" (see Granatstein, 1997). They know that undisguised demands for a larger income or higher profits have little appeal (unless, perhaps when the policy maker can see that granting the rent seekers' desire will also result in the achievement of the policy makers goals).

10. The Canadian content policy regime is extraordinarily complex. It is comprised of many components and legal authority is scattered over thousands of pages of statutes, regulations, guidelines, decisions of the CRTC, decisions of the Minister of Industry under the Radiocommunication Act, decisions of the courts, and policy directives and decisions of the cabinet on appeals from decisions of the CRTC. Complexity creates a barrier to potential opponents and much work for specialists on the regulatory regime. A complex policy (partly because all of its elements are hard to identify) is also hard to evaluate in terms of its consequences. In the absence of authoritative evaluations, it is much easier for its proponents to claim that it is a "success" by referring to selected aspects of its consequences.

A great deal is claimed on behalf of Canadian content regulations by their proponents. Those claims are discussed in the next section.

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Last Modified: Wednesday, October 20, 1999.