Risky News

by Kelly Torrance

Life is risky. We take risks when we drive to work in the morning, eat a grease-laden hamburger, go for an airplane ride, or even take a shower. Many risks have been eliminated and we live longer now than people at any time in history. Such success, however, has led to outrage at random, meaningless deaths, such as those caused by Jetskis or flying truck wheels, even though the number of fatalities is minuscule.

Many people believe a risk-free society is attainable—61 percent in a 1992 Health Canada survey of 1,500 Canadians.¹ Why? The same study found that people get the vast majority of their information about health issues and risk from the news media. About half of the respondents said they receive “a lot” of information on risk from the media, and about 35 percent said they receive a “fair” amount. Physicians, the next most popular source, give only about a quarter of respondents “a lot” of information. Media reports are extremely influential. One study found that “media coverage of a toxic exposure may lead people to report symptoms, even though their actual exposure was very slight.”²

People feel not only symptoms, but also fear. In the 1992 Health Canada survey, for example, respondents evaluated nuclear waste and nuclear power as a higher risk to themselves or their family than anything else. This was true even of people who live thousands of miles from nuclear power plants.

How does the media represent risk? To find out, this study used the example of transport accidents. Accidents account for a significant amount of media coverage—around 4 to 5 percent of CTV and CBC national news, which is more than coverage of health and disease.³

Most transport accidents involve motor vehicles. Of the 3,488 people who died in transport-related accidents in Canada in 1995, 93 percent were killed in automobile collisions. Water transport accidents accounted for 3 percent of transport-related deaths; air accidents, another 3 percent; and railway accidents, less than one percent.⁴

The world according to national television news is rather different. On CBC and CTV in 1997, motor vehicle accidents accounted for less than half of collision reports, at 49 percent. Air accidents were greatly overrepresented as they were the subject of 35 percent of accident stories. Railway and water transport accidents were also overemphasized, accounting for 11 percent and 5 percent of accident reports respectively.

Motor vehicle accidents only received as much coverage as they did because of stories involving celebrities. The most famous woman in world, Diana, Princess of Wales, died in a car accident, which was one of the most reported events of the year. Other celebrities in motor vehicle accidents included boxer Mike Tyson, involved in a motorcycle collision, Detroit Red Wing Vladimir Konstantinov, left in a coma after his accident, and Canadian sprinter Donovan Bailey, whom police charged after his crash. There were only a few reports of airline crashes involving celebrities, such as the one causing the death of country singer John Denver.

Obviously, national television news does not explain the real risks associated with transport. Three case studies were examined in depth to find out what solutions the media proposed to deal with perceived “problems.” Although most of the problems identified involved small risks, they received a great deal of media attention, some of it verging on the hysterical. And overwhelmingly, the government was urged to do something.

Media say flying truck wheels rampant on highways

Both CTV and CBC reported the Ontario government’s introduction of legislation to deal with flying truck wheels. Commercial truck drivers or fleet owners would pay from $2,000 to $50,000 if their trucks lost a wheel, regardless of the reason.

“Flying truck wheels have been a horrifying and all too familiar sight lately on Canada’s roads and highways,” CTV anchor Lloyd Robertson began his February 21, 1997 report. The network noted that four people had been killed due to flying truck wheels in Ontario since 1995. Reporter George Wolff began with an account of a two-month-old accident, in which two people died after a flying tire hit their car. He then detailed the Ontario bill, the “toughest law in Canada,” and provided comments from politicians calling for a federal truck safety program.

The report was favourable to the new regulation, with interviews from politicians, and a friend and relative of the accident victims. The only opposition voice was that of the federal transport minister; he said the problem was a provincial responsibility and the provinces should ensure trucks meet existing standards. No one from the industry was quoted. The reporter concluded, “It’s a danger that only tough laws can control and already tonight the Ontario Trucking Association was warning that [Minister Al] Palladini’s new law could run head on into a constitutional challenge.”

CBC, in its report the same day, saw the problem in a similar way: “an all too common sight on the highways around Toronto.” The station granted more time to opposition voices than did CTV, however. An Ontario Trucking Association spokesman argued, “It’s often not the truckers’ fault themselves, maybe a third party tire service company or whoever’s doing work on the wheel is just as much at fault.” An anonymous trucker voiced concern that the fines would put companies out of business. “Don’t tell that to the family of Angela Worona,” reporter Jeffrey Kofman responded. He recounted a two-year-old fatal flying wheel accident, which was used to dismiss industry concerns. The victim’s sister called for the government to take away licenses. The story concluded with the Ontario government’s suggestion of national standards, and, in contrast to CTV, CBC reported that a spokesman for the federal transport minister agreed and called for continent-wide regulations.

National news networks apparently believe that flying truck wheels are a major problem only government can fix. This, after CTV itself observed that only 4 people had died in Ontario in such accidents in two years. In 1995, trucks 5 tons or over accounted for 162 fatal accidents in all of Canada, not all of which, of course, involved flying wheels, that “all too familiar” sight.

Will one accident mean the end of Jetskis?

Two small Quebec children were killed July 12, 1997, when a personal watercraft (more commonly known as a Jetski) collided with their inflatable boat. CTV’s first report on the accident, the next day, focused on safety concerns, quoting two sources. A marina operator said that almost anyone can rent a Jetski. An owner defended himself against the charge of noise, claiming boats are just as noisy. Reporter Scott Laurie then concluded, “the accident might intensify demands for stricter regulations and licensing of Jetski riders to control something that’s made for fun but has caused so much grief.” There was no mention of what caused the accident or how regulation could have prevented it. No sources made any arguments for regulation, either.

The network ran another report on July 19, after the children’s funeral. Reporter Cindy Sherwin translated a mourner’s brief comments and a policeman was quoted discussing how to determine the speed of the crafts. No mention of regulation was made by any source, but the reporter ended the story by saying, “[police] findings will likely lead to a municipal law controlling the speed of Jetskis. However, many here hope the federal government will pass broader legislation regulating the age and experience of the drivers as well.”

The CBC also promoted regulation in a July 14 report on the accident. Reporter Mark Kelley interviewed a boater who said simply that accidents should be prevented. As to how, the head of the federal Boating Law Task Force declared that “the sentiment of opinion was there should be mandatory training for everyone who operates a recreational boat in Canada.” A spokesman for Bombardier, which makes Sea-Doos, a competitor product to Jetskis, pointed out that the company gives a training video to its customers. “But critics say the federal government, not the boating industry, should be setting the rules and regulations,” the reporter stated, quoting the Quebec transport minister. The story ended with the suggestion that the accident would result in the end of the Jetski craze: “Even the [rental shop] owner says he doesn’t think they’re so much fun any more.”

There were only 12 fatalities related to personal watercraft in 1997. In 1995, there were only 4. Still, the government responded to media calls for regulation. This year the federal government ruled that those under the age of 16 could not operate personal watercraft. And after April 1, 2002, craft operators must meet mandatory training requirements.

Cutbacks could kill, media reports

Aircraft

On December 16, 1997, Air Canada flight 646 crashed in Fredericton, New Brunswick; there were injuries but no fatalities. A day after the accident, CTV looked at safety concerns. “Critics say Liberal government cutbacks are putting the travelling public at risk—cuts like the ones which left Fredericton airport without an air traffic controller,” stated Lloyd Robertson. The cause of the crash was still unknown and no mention was made of how the crash related to an unmanned control tower. Still, the crash is evidence, insisted Harry Gow, a spokesman for the lobby group Transport 2000, that “the air traffic safety system in Canada is coming apart at the seams.” An Aircraft Operators Group spokesman agreed. The network did report opposing voices from the federal transport minister and a spokesman from NAVCAN, the private company which took control of the air navigation system in 1996. The insinuation, however, was that the unmanned control tower was responsible for the accident—reporter Craig Oliver observed that the company was still planning to remove controllers in other airports, “despite the Fredericton experience.”

A CBC story that day also looked at cutbacks to air traffic control services “and whether they may have contributed to the accident.” Again, there was no explanation of how cutbacks might have led to the accident, the cause of which was still unknown. A Transportation Safety Board spokesman admitted that having no control tower in Fredericton probably caused delays in helping the injured. Quoted next was Transport 2000’s Harry Gow, who again argued that cutbacks were causing safety problems and warned, “And if they don’t watch it, they’ll have a 747 coming down in a Montreal suburb next.” Federal Transport Minister David Collenette pointed out that the aircraft accident rate has dropped steadily over the last decade. Reporter Sasa Petricic ended the story, however, by recounting three recent accidents and questioning whether cutbacks “have resulted in either savings or safety.” A federal auditor’s report concluded, said the reporter, that “the government didn’t include measures to ensure that Transport Canada could continue to monitor safety” after privatization of air traffic control services.

CTV devoted a Christmas Eve report to the safety concerns of fire chiefs. “Now no one died in last week’s crash, but the fire chiefs say that is no thanks to Ottawa,” anchor Dana Lewis said. The firefighters complained that they are required to hose down a plane, but not rescue survivors. A Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs spokesman noted that he has been lobbying for tougher standards. He argued that there would not have been enough emergency workers at the Fredericton airport to handle a fire had one broken out after the accident, a situation that could have led to fatalities. The chief was the only person quoted in the story and his opinion went unquestioned. The report ended with the information that the government “now promises to clean up a planned review in the new year.”

CTV’s account of firefighters’ safety concerns gives the impression that the chiefs’ opinions are irrefutable—no opposition was provided. A report commissioned by Transport Canada and reported in the Vancouver Sun June 16, 1998, provides another point of view, however. The report concluded that media reporting on the Fredericton crash caused a “distorted public perception” of emergency response measures. “No reasonable argument, moral or economic,” supports full-time rescue and firefighting systems at all airports, the report found. “Using the Fredericton accident as a cause célèbre, firefighters have unnecessarily alarmed the Canadian public.”⁵ This may not be the entire story either, but this perspective was not even considered by CTV.

The federal government responded to the media pressure in February, making firefighting services available for every flight in the country’s busiest 28 airports. The Fredericton accident “renewed pressure on the government to review its rescue and firefighting standards at airports,” the Halifax Daily News reported.⁶ Air travel, however, is already extremely safe—there were only 96 air-related fatalities in Canada in 1995.

Raw milk cheeses

Other studies have found similar results—risks misrepresented with subsequent support for government regulation. In Canada in 1996, the federal government wanted to ban cheese made from unpasteurized milk. Worldwide since 1971, there had been 4,228 illnesses and 57 deaths attributed to raw-milk cheese.⁷ The National Media Archive examined media reports on the proposed regulation on CBC and CTV and in the Globe and Mail.

The CBC strongly supported the government’s plan. Over 70 percent of the network’s assessment agreed that government intervention was needed to protect the public from the risk.⁸ CTV and Globe and Mail coverage was more balanced—56 percent of CTV analysis and 39 percent of Globe and Mail analysis argued that regulation was unnecessary. CBC also lagged behind the other outlets in terms of the amount of their coverage that dealt with public reaction, including that of consumers, industry representatives, and the Quebec government—6 percent compared to 25 percent in the Globe and Mail and 41 percent on CTV.

Tobacco

The Media Research Center (MRC) in Alexandria, Virginia conducted a study on tobacco in the news. The organization examined all stories on several risky products, such as tobacco, dietary fat, automobiles, alcohol, and pesticides, on the morning and evening news shows on ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN’s “World News” and “World Today” shows between August 1, 1995, and July 31, 1996. It found that tobacco received “far more total coverage with a far more negative tone” than any other risky product.⁹ During the period covered, there were 413 reports on tobacco, 340 on all illegal drugs combined, 136 on dietary fat and obesity, 94 on automobile safety, and 58 on alcohol and health.

After establishing the problem, the media advocated further regulation of the industry. “In stories about tobacco regulation, tobacco advertising, tobacco lawsuits, campaign contributions from tobacco companies, and second-hand smoke, there were more than twice as many soundbites from those opposed to the tobacco industry than from those either supporting tobacco or opposing government regulation,” the MRC study concluded (270 soundbites to 116). Anti-tobacco/pro-regu- lation sources were also given the last word in 132 tobacco stories, compared to 40 stories for pro-tobacco/anti-regulation sources.

Serious implications

The media’s misrepresentation of certain risks and the ensuing calls for government regulation have serious implications. Canadians get most of their information on risk from the media, and government, in turn, responds. In 1993-94, the burden of federal, provincial, and local regulations was $85.7 billion, 12 percent of GDP. This translates into a hidden tax of about $12,000 annually per family of four.¹⁰

Attempts to eliminate or reduce risk often do not accomplish their goals. One example is government-mandated automobile safety and pollution standards. The estimated cost of an airbag is between $1,300 and $2,200. If airbags are mandatory, some people will be unable to afford a new car. They may keep their old cars, or buy used cars which may be less safe than new cars without air bags.¹¹ Pollution standards may produce similar results. Money may be spent on making cars that pollute less, with diminishing returns. But again, people may use older cars that pollute more than newer cars, made before the new standards.

Regulations can also carry unintended consequences. In the 1970s, for example, child-resistant caps on some medicines were made mandatory. But afterwards, the numbers of child poisonings actually increased. Parents, it seems, felt safer with the new caps and thus were not as attentive to their children’s safety as they had been before the caps were introduced.¹²

Reporting on risk is often done out of context. If the media provided more information on the relative risks of activities on which they report, Canadians could judge meaningfully the various risks they face. Our resources are not unlimited. If risks are not assessed comparatively, resources will be wasted on attempting to decrease or eliminate minute risks, which in turn, paradoxically, could put more lives in danger. Many people object to the idea of putting a dollar value on life, but with limited resources, money should be allocated to where it can do the most good. Air travel, for example, has become extremely safe, and there are diminishing returns to spending any more money on airline safety.

The Harvard Center for Risk Analysis examined 185 life-saving interventions. It found the regulations cost $21.4 billion and saved 56,700 lives annually. Authors Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham estimated that those resources could be reallocated to save a total of 117,000 lives. As an example, they compared money spent on regulating fire retardant clothing with the cost of smoke detectors: “We regulate the flammability of children’s clothing, spending $1.5 million per year of life saved, while some 30 percent of those children live in homes without smoke alarms, an investment that costs about $200,000 per year of life saved.”¹³

Still, after many tragedies which have received media attention, the government, with media approval, is quick to introduce new regulations, regardless of their cost or potential effectiveness. Governments rarely seem to consider options outside of regulation. More often, it appears they respond to media-charged safety concerns, whether resources are best deployed there or not.

Methodology

Results are based on 108 CBC “National” and “Sunday Report” stories and 186 “CTV News” stories during 1997 that contained the keywords “car,” “auto,” “truck,” “trucking,” “bus,” “motorcycle,” “motorbike,” “airplane,” “plane,” “aircraft,” “airliner,” “jet,” “train,” “railway,” “boat,” “boating,” “yacht,” “ship,” “sailboat,” rowboat,” “canoe,” “houseboat,” “dinghy,” “jetski,” “jet ski,” “watercraft,” “seadoo,” “bicycle,” “bike,” “cycle,” “snowmobile,” “skidoo,” or “snow vehicle,” and “accident,” “crash,” “fire,” or “explosion.”

To be included, stories had to mention a specific accident and the accident could not be a brief mention in a story primarily about something unrelated.

Endnotes

1Health Canada, Health-Risk Perception in Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993.

2 P. Lees-Haley and R.S. Brown, “Biases in perception and reporting following a perceived toxic exposure,” Percept. Motor Skills 75 (1992), pp. 531-544. Cited in Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds., Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 32.

3”1997 Year in Review,” On Balance, vol. 11, no. 3, 1998.

4Statistics Canada, Deaths, by Cause, cat. 84-209, 1995, table 8, pp. 98-136.

5Vancouver Sun, June 16, 1998, p. A10.

6Halifax Daily News, February 4, 1998, p. 9.

7Dr. J.-Y, D’Aoust, work in progress, Bureau of Microbial Hazards: Health Canada, 1996.

8“Cheese, Politics, and Human Health: How the Media Failed to Critique Recent Government Policy,” On Balance, vol. 9, no. 5, 1996.

9Timothy Lamer, Addicted to Tobacco Stories: A One-Sided Portrayal of a Risky Product, Arlington, VA: Media Research Center, 1996.

10Fazil Mihlar, “Federal Regulatory Reform: Rhetoric or Reality?” Public Policy Sources, Number 6, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1997.

11Fazil Mihlar, “Regulatory Overkill: The Cost of Regulation in Canada,” Critical Issues Bulletin, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1996.

12Cited in John R. Lott, “Gun Locks: Bound to Misfire,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 1997.

13Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, “The Opportunity Cost of Haphazard Investments in Life-Saving,” in R. Hahn, ed., Improving Risk Management: From Science to Policy, Oxford University Press, 1996.

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Last Modified: Wednesday, October 20, 1999.