The Ambiguous Advice of the Precautionary Principle

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Glenn Fox

The "Precautionary Principle" has rapidly become one of the most powerful ideas in environmental policy. It was influential at the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development as well as in the development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Wingspread Conference on Implementing the Precautionary Principle held at Racine, Wisconsin, in January 1998, brought together researchers and environmental activists in an effort to map out the policy implications of the principle. A recent web search on these two keywords produced 10,700 results.

The essence of the Precautionary Principle is derived from the familiar proverbs "It is better to be safe than sorry," "Look before you leap," or, even, "Marry in haste, repent at leisure." All of this is, of course, sound advice. It is prudent to think before we act. Acting recklessly in our personal lives often leads to unpleasant consequences. The Precautionary Principle puts a new perspective on prudence, however, in contemporary discussions of environmental issues. Its application typically goes something like this. Some scientists suspect that human activity X poses a risk in the form of environmental damage to Y. We do not yet possess compelling evidence documenting the relationship between activity X and the environmental effect Y, but if we don't act now to stop doing X, the damage to Y may soon be severe and irreversible, so we should act now.

There are many examples of this type of situation. There seems to be scientific uncertainty about the relationship between human activity and global climate change, and about the relationship between global climate change and long-term human and environmental well-being. But it is better to be safe than sorry. We should act now just in case the suspected problem materializes. There is considerable controversy about the potential risks to human health and to the ecosystem of agricultural biotechnology, especially from so-called genetically modified organisms. There may be benefits in the form of lower food costs, better nutrition, or other forms of improved food quality, but it is better to be safe than sorry. We should severely limit the development and application of this technology until we are in a better position to mitigate these potential risks.

All of this sounds sensible. The persuasive power of the Precautionary Principle is almost irresistible. The 19th century French economist Frederic Bastiat,1 however, encourages us to think more deeply about this principle. According to Bastiat, the challenge for social scientists as students of social policy is to look beyond the immediate and anticipated effects of an action and to foresee the series of effects of a policy that are often unanticipated. The risks and benefits of the unintended consequences of policy need to be taken into account.

So what does this have to do with the Precautionary Principle? A general application of the principle is in full agreement with Bastiat. Let's consider the effects that are not seen before we act. The trouble is that this advice is not often followed. The manner in which the Precautionary Principle is typically invoked is one-sided. It recognizes one category of unseen consequences but not another. We are urged to look before we leap, but to only look for one type of risk.

The category of risk that is usually ignored is this. Suppose we suspect that human activity X may pose a risk to environmental value Y. Suppose that we act, in the form of stopping X. Then we find out that X was not a risk to Y after all. Or we may find that stopping X has had other unforseen and undesirable consequences that are worse than the damage to Y that we sought to avoid in the first place. A consistent application of the Precautionary Principle would be as equally aware of the downside risk of stopping doing X as it would be of continuing to do X. So the advice of the Precautionary Principle is, in practice, ambiguous. Should we stop doing X? On the one hand the principle says yes, since we later might be sorry if problem Y materializes and we don't act now. On the other hand, acting now to stop doing X also raises the possibility of regrets in the future. We may learn that the cure of not doing X is worse than the disease.

So what should we do with the Precautionary Principle? I am not suggesting that it be abandoned. In fact, I recommend that we affirm the principle, but that we take it more seriously. This means being equally prudent about the downside risks of acting and of not acting in the face of imperfect scientific information. We need a more balanced acknowledgment that while there are risks from not intervening in the status quo, there are also risks if we do intervene. The discussion that needs to take place is whether one source of risk is more or less serious than the other. The current one-sided application of the Precautionary Principle is preventing that discussion from taking place.

Note

1. Frederic Bastiat (1964) Selected Essays on Political Economy, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY, p. 1.

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