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December 2000 Fraser Forum: The Translink Levy: Taxing Patience More than Congestion
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Miriam Bixby
Translink, the Greater Vancouver Regional District’s (GVRD’s) independent
transportation provider, is aggressively pushing the adoption of a new
vehicle levy to take effect in October 2001. The proposed tax ranges from
$40 to $190 per vehicle per year depending on the vehicle’s weight and
insurance category, and is expected to raise over $90 million in transportation
revenue annually (Translink Report to Board of Directors October 27th,
2000). Translink plans to spend this revenue to improve roads and increase
the use of public transportation, which, it claims, is necessary to reduce
congestion and pollution from vehicles. Translink presupposes that reductions
in the number of drivers is desirable and a reduction in the amount of
pollution from vehicles is necessary. The proposed levy has infuriated
drivers and local politicians who argue that vehicle owners already pay
their share of transportation costs in the province through provincial
and federal fuel taxes, parking fees, and licensing fees.
Ken Dobell, Translink’s CEO, argues that without the revenue from the levy,
the current quality of the transit system in the GVRD will deteriorate.
In fact, on November 9th, a Translink committee vote to delay approval
of the levy forced Dobell to cancel 80,000 hours of previously existing
public transit in the GVRD, a service that required an early-November approval
of the Strategic Transportation Plan’s (STPs) budget, which includes the
vehicle levy.
History of vehicle taxes in Canada
Provincial fuel taxes were first introduced in the 1920s. Initially, most
of the revenue collected from these taxes was spent on improvements to
roads. British Columbia began charging provincial fuel taxes in the early
1950s: the initial tax of three cents per gallon was dedicated exclusively
to provincial road expenditures (CAA 1998, pp. 2-3). In 1971, as provincial
fuel taxes were rising, the Canadian government introduced federal fuel
taxes, which, in 1975, consisted of an excise tax of 1.5 cents per litre.
Today, consumers pay a federal excise tax of 10 cents per litre in addition
to the GST rate of 7 percent. British Columbia’s provincial fuel taxes
increased from 3.7 cents per litre in 1980 to 9 cents per litre in 1990
to 15 cents per litre today (Canadian Taxpayers Federation 1999, App. I).
Road revenues versus expenditures
A ratio of road-related revenues to road-related expenditures close to
one, given an effective and efficient use of these funds, would indicate
a responsible and accountable transportation bureaucracy. However, increasing
fuel taxes accompanied by stagnant transportation spending created a growing
disparity between the revenues collected by the federal and provincial
governments, and their corresponding expenditures on road infrastructure
and maintenance. Federal revenue from fuel taxes was $5.8 billion in 1998/1999,
while transfers from the federal government to the provinces for road-related
transportation spending was a mere $194 million, less than four percent
of revenues collected from the provinces. British Columbia’s revenue from
fuel taxes amounted to $1.2 billion in 1998/1999, whereas expenditure on
road-related transportation was $778.6 million, only 65 percent of revenues
(Canadian Taxpayers Federation, 2000).1 The remaining 96 percent of federal
and 35 percent of provincial transportation revenue collected becomes part
of general revenue.
The gross disparity between the revenues that are collected from fuel taxes
and the expenditures on road-related transportation should frustrate both
those opposed to the Translink levy and those who argue for its approval.
A viable alternative to the proposed levy would be a 2-cent diversion in
both provincial and federal fuel taxes from general revenue. This would
raise $92 million annually to provide for necessary upgraded roads and
other transportation initiatives (Canadian Taxpayers Federation, 2000).
The levy: is it necessary?
Most of the controversy surrounding Translink’s Strategic Transportation
Plan has focused on where the money will come from. However, there are
more fundamental questions: Do the assumptions behind the Translink plan
make sense? Are the objectives achievable or even desirable?
Congestion
Translink authorities assert that the vehicle levy will reduce congestion.
This claim assumes that congestion is caused by an excess supply of drivers
who are imposing a cost on society, that public transit is a viable substitute
to private vehicles, and that drivers have a relatively elastic demand
curve for cars (i.e., an increase in the cost of driving will result in
a significant shift away from driving). If congestion is considered a cost
to society, then the responsible individuals ought to be held accountable
for compensating those bearing the burden of this cost. Kenneth Green from
the Reason Foundation found, however, that in the unique case of vehicular
congestion, those responsible and those affected were the same:
Since we are all subject to the very same uncertainties, and since we all
know that any particular driving experience is but one round in an ongoing
series of driver-upon-driver interactions, at any given time every auto
user will be in both groups: those that slow traffic by their entrance
into congested flow, and those who suffer the loss of time from someone
else’s (or many someone elses’) ill-timed entrance. In an infinite series
of such interactions, such user-on-user impositions should cancel one another
out, distributing the cost of increased congestion equally among auto users.
(Green, p. 18)
The cost of road congestion is being recovered implicitly by drivers. (However,
this does not mean that the most efficient outcome has been achieved. A
more optimal result may develop if a direct user fee were implemented in
the form of a highway toll. The proposed levy will be ineffective in achieving
this optimal level of congestion since taxing vehicle owners is indirect
and ineffective, as is discussed in more detail below.) The real issue
behind the congestion argument is that an appropriate number of drivers
are receiving an inappropriate and ineffective number of upgraded miles
of road. There is a disparity between road supply and demand. A report
by The Canadian Automobile Association (CAA) asserts that congestion problems
would greatly diminish if even a small percentage of revenue from fuel
taxes collected by the provincial and federal governments was re-invested
into our road system (CAA, 1998).
Translink also incorrectly expects that by increasing the cost of private
transportation through the tax, it will reduce the number of drivers and
increase the number of people using public transit. However, several empirical
studies in both Canada and the United States have concluded that increased
investment in public transit does not necessarily increase ridership (see,
for example, Randall O’Toole’s study from the Thoreau Institute at http://www.teleport.com/~rot/Automyth.html).
Despite the significant recent investment in the public transit system
in Canada, between 1986 and 1994 annual transit rides per capita in Canada
fell from 110 to 82 (Transport Canada). If significant financial investment
into public transit has not increased ridership and reduced vehicle use
in the past, then perhaps Translink should revisit the key objectives of
its proposed levy.
The Translink levy is designed to force the marginal vehicle user off the
road. This assumes that a reduction in the number of drivers is viable
and beneficial for society and, specifically, for GVRD residents. Yet,
inarguably, the motor vehicle has exponentially increased the efficiency
and effectiveness of individual transactions, particularly for families
with young children and disabled and elderly individuals, a benefit often
ignored since discussions on automobile use most often focus on the costs
of using private vehicles. Canadians have chosen the private vehicle as
their preferred mode of transportation and consume vehicle use as they
do essential food or housing goods. A rough calculation using a standard
vehicle elasticity reveals that the $120 average levy would result in a
mere 5 percent of drivers shifting off the roads.2 As a result, an increase
in the cost of owning and driving a vehicle will negligibly shift the marginal
driver off the road, an indication that the vehicle levy would be ineffective.
Pollution
Translink’s Strategic Transportation Plan outlines the organization’s initiatives
for transportation in the GVRD over the next 5 years. One of its key objectives
is a reduction in car and light truck emissions including greenhouse gases
(GHGs) such as CO2, and ground level ozone gases such as VOC and NOx. There
is an implicit assumption in this objective that these emissions are posing
increasing health and environmental dangers.
The Canadian Automobile Association (CAA) commissioned several scientific
assessments by an independent consulting group, Energy and Environmental
Analysis (EEA), in order to determine the impact of cars and light trucks
on environmental and human health. EEA measured emissions of CO2, VOC,
and NOx. Their recent study of CO2 emissions in Canada reports that, in
every province, passenger vehicles account for less than 20 percent of
total CO2 emissions. In British Columbia, vehicle emissions will account
for only 15.65 percent of total CO2 emissions in 2000, down from 16.81
percent in 1980, despite a significant increase in vehicle usage (EEA 1995).
Similarly, EEA’s study of VOC and NOx shows that since 1995, VOC and NOx
emitted by autos and light trucks in Vancouver have decreased from 30 percent
to 28.3 percent of total VOC and NOx emissions in the area, and are projected
to reach 27.9 percent by 2005. This projection is particularly striking
since between 1980 and 2005, total vehicle kilometres driven are expected
to increase by 103 percent (EEA, 2000).
Translink’s STP falsely represents the impact of vehicle emissions, exaggerating
the effects of NOx and VOC on human health and the effects of CO2 on the
environment, an impact that the vehicle levy is specifically designed to
reduce.
Conclusion
In order to make a fiscally and socially responsible decision about the
use of public funds, expected benefits of the proposed policy must outweigh
any expected costs. Translink has proposed a levy to decrease congestion
and pollution by increasing the use of public transit. But because increasing
the cost to drivers will not significantly change the number of drivers
on the road, the levy’s focus on decreasing the use of private vehicles
is misplaced and should shift to upgrading inadequate roads, or even directly
targeting the users with a road toll. Moreover, public transit has not
proven to be an effective substitute. Thus, an upgraded transit system
is unlikely to provide the expected benefits of reduced congestion through
increased ridership. Finally, despite Translink’s claim, there is a decreasing
trend in emissions dangers to environmental and human health, evidence
that spending to reduce these impacts would be misplaced.
The costs of the proposed levy are these: an additional vehicle tax of
$75, on average, when there already exists a great disparity between fuel
tax revenues and transportation expenditures; an increase in the cost of
owning and operating a private vehicle without a corresponding increase
in services; and a tax that is disproportionately placing the burden of
transportation as well as general expenditures onto private vehicle owners.
A critical examination of Translink’s STP and of the federal and provincial
governments’ transportation initiatives reveals a lack of fiscal accountability
and a failure to incorporate relevant empirical evidence and sound judgement
into an important policy decision.
Note
1In 1999/2000, BC’s ratio of expenditures-to-revenues was 148 percent.
However, this is atypical. In 1999/2000, BC Ministry of Transportation
forgave the BC Ferry Corporation’s $1.08 billion debt, which was treated
as transportation expenditure.
2For this calculation, a 1.14 elasticity of demand for vehicles was assumed
using a $10,000 average cost per vehicle over a four-year period. Source:
Michael Parkin, 1998, Microeconomics, 4th ed., Addison-Wesley, p. 97.
Sources
Canadian Automobile Association (1998). Automobiles in Canada: A Reality
Check. Digital Document: www.caa.ca/CAAInternet/onlinelibrary/autosincanada/autosincanada.htm
Energy and Environmental Analysis (1995). A Report on Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Trends from Automobiles and Light Trucks. [Commissioned by the Canadian
Automobile Association]: Arlington, Virginia.
Energy and Environmental Analysis (2000). An Updated Look at VOC and NOx
Emission Trends in Vancouver. [Commissioned by the Canadian Automobile
Association]: Arlington, Virginia.
Kenneth Green (1995). Defending Automobility: A Critical Examination of
the Environmental and Social Costs of Auto Use. Policy Study No.198. The
Reason Foundation.
Canadian Taxpayers Federation (1999). Gas Tax Honesty Day: Gas Taxes: Use
them or lose them. Digital Document: www.taxpayer.com/studies/federal/Gastaxreport2-a.htm.
Canadian Taxpayers Federation (2000). Canada’s Gas Taxes = Highway Robbery.
Digital Document: http://www.taxpayer.com/Gastaxreport2000A.pdf
Translink (2000). Strategic Transportation Plan. Digital Document: www.translink.bc.ca/rto/gvrd.htm.
Transport Canada (1999). Transportation in Canada 1999: Annual Report.
Digital Document: http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/anre1999/tc9900ae.pdf.
Miriam Bixby (miriamb@fraserinstitute.ca) is a Research Economist at
The Fraser Institute. She has an MA in Economics, with a specialization
in the environment, from the University of Toronto.
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