April 2001
Ministers' Motivations and the Public Choice Perspective
by W.T. Stanbury
In the course of three decades of work on public policy in Canada, I have been made increasingly aware of the view that politicians, particularly cabinet ministers, abhor policy analyses that suggest that their words and actions are motivated by the desire to get re-elected. Their officials usually make it clear that ministers motives' should not be questioned. They imply that every word and deed of ministers is in furtherance of "the public interest," or is designed to balance a host of subtle, dynamic, and conflicting interests to achieve the best of all possible worlds.
This perspective directly contradicts what seems to be blindingly obvious:
- All current (and past) cabinet ministers ran for office, some for the nth time.
- Each devoted considerable time, energy and money (largely other people's) to getting elected.
- During debates in the House of Commons, ministers rally the troops to ensure that their party is not defeated on a confidence motion.
- Ministers give speeches in which— among other things— they explain why it is not possible to do any number of things proposed by a variety of individuals and organizations— because there is insufficient political support for it. What they seem to be saying is that if such suggestions were to be implemented, the likelihood of their party retaining power would be unacceptably diminished.
- Many (but not all) backbenchers vie endlessly for the PM's eye so they, too, can be elevated to a ministerial post (complete with car, driver, and a handful of energetic special assistants). That's where the real power is.
All these actions seem to be aimed at getting elected or staying in power. Election is a prerequisite to holding and wielding real power. If ministers did not select, shape, and promote policies which they believe would get them and their party re-elected, they would be contradicting their raison d'etre. They care greatly about votes because that is the core of the job: finding ways to obtain sufficient political support for the acts of governing in a democracy. I believe that is what Lincoln meant when he spoke of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."
But why are ministers (and their officials) apparently so sensitive about the idea that they shape policy with a close eye on their and their party's chances of re-election? Surely the whole point of trying to become a minister is to do the Lord's work and the point of trying to get re-elected is to continue to do more of the Lord's work. Business executives, we take for granted, want to maximize shareholders' wealth. Their words and actions are guided by this objective. It is perfectly natural for cabinet ministers to want to get re-elected or at least see that their party retains power. If they didn't believe that their party and its front bench is superior to all available alternatives, why do they stay in politics?
It is not cynical or scandalous to suggest that most public policies are shaped— implicitly if not overtly— by the consideration of how well they sit with voters. If ministers consistently and resolutely focused on any other objective, they surely would give hostage to political fortune. Paying close attention to how a policy (particularly a major one) is likely to affect the probability of re-election is another way of saying that ministers are trying to be responsive to the crude, conflicting, and even inchoate signals from the electorate. Ministers operate in the political market where votes are crucial signalling mechanisms. Business executives operate in economic markets where prices and profits are the signalling mechanisms.
So why the apparent sensitivity of ministers to what academics call the public choice perspective? (In passing, it may be that senior public servants exaggerate the sensitivity of ministers to the public choice perspective.) Why the apparent need for the illusion that they are unself-interested and undeviating toilers for the common weal?1 Well, we all like to have a more favourable image of ourselves. (I would like to be 6'4" and 220 lbs., not a slouching 6'2" and 280 lbs.) Why shouldn't ministers acknowledge to themselves, to their officials, and most of all to voters that they traffic in votes. They are the (indirect) agents of citizens (their collective principal) in a democracy where their legitimacy depends entirely on the authority delegated to them by citizens in periodic elections. Their job, therefore, is to be the best possible agents for citizens. This is a tough job, in part because citizens send a bewildering variety of signals, and the content and volume of these signals change frequently. Listening, filtering, judging, persuading, and acting are all part of this absolutely vital job. Evidence of success is re-election—as the Prime Minister repeatedly reminded his opponents and critics after the last election.
Those of us who often criticize the words and actions of ministers do so, not because we challenge their legitimacy, but because we want ministers' actions to reflect ourpreferences and ideas. We criticize, too, because as citizens we see ministers as our agents, not our masters. Citizens are the fount of legitimate power of coercion exercised by ministers. The principal's responsibility is to tell the agent what he or she wants done. The point of the criticism is to try to make ministers accountable on all the days between elections. Politics is too important to be left to ministers. Politics is too important to be left solely to election day.
So ministers should, as the kids say, "lighten up" (and so should their earnest and overly-protective advisors). They should seriously engage their critics, not merely brush them off or huff and puff about their dignity (or rely on public servants to shelter them from the criticisms of policy analysts). Ministers traffic in votes—that is their self-chosen occupation. They should be proud of it. When they do a good job, citizens will be proud of them.
Note
1 If ministers are not self-interested (this is not to say selfish), they are the only human beings who have this remarkable trait. (I am not sure about Mother Theresa.)
W.T. Stanbury, Ph.D., is Professor Emeritus from the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia.
info@fraserinstitute.ca
4th Floor, 1770 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6J 3G7
Tel: (604) 688-0221 Fax: (604) 688-8539 Book Orders: 1-800-665-3558 ext. 580
You can contact us at the above email address for any comments or information requests. Please report any dead links or technical problems.