January 2002
How the World Changed on September 11
by Bill Emmott
I'm particularly pleased to be here as a guest of The Fraser Institute and to have heard from Fred McMahon about his new Centre for the Study of Globalization and Trade. There is much in common between this new division of The Fraser Institute and The Economist.
We at The Economist have pressed for globalization ever since we were founded in 1843; it was part of the campaign for freeing up agricultural trade in Britain—the anti-corn law campaign. Our founder, Scottish businessman James Wilson, realized that Britain would prosper more if trade were freer. We at the magazine have a global mission and a global circulation. (Only 20 percent of our sales are in Britain. Canada is, in fact, our third largest national market.) I'm very proud of our interest in globalization.
In keeping with that focus, I'm here to take a global view of a very serious subject: how the world has changed since the terrible acts of September 11th. I was in New York when it all happened, in fact, and had the curious phenomenon, for a journalist, of being there exactly where it happened, but actually unable, because of what had happened, to have any influence over what The Economist had to say about it because I couldn't communicate with my office in London. Fortunately, my deputy editor did an absolutely brilliant job on the issue that week, and I've been back in London ever since.
So how has the world changed since September 11th? In some senses it's actually too early to say. The picture keeps changing, as you might expect it to.
The truth is that what was set off on September 11th was a battle for change, which is what the al-Qaeda terrorists, led by Osama bin Laden, wanted to achieve. I think it's reasonable to assume that what they were seeking to change by attacking New York and Washington was the attitude and behaviour of the United States. Probably more important to them, however, was that they were hoping to destabilize the world they inhabit and in which they think that they've got some chance of power, namely, the Islamic world in general, and the Arab world in particular. I think that they wanted to force change in Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons capability, and in Saudi Arabia with its oil and its holy places Mecca and Medina, and probably in Egypt which has some resources, but particularly a large population by the standards of the Arab world.
In response to them, the Western Alliance, led by the United States, clearly has also got change on its mind. It wants to change the ability of organizations like al-Qaeda to carry out acts of the September 11th sort. It wants to change the propensity of countries around the world to sponsor, or at least act as hosts, for terrorist groups of this kind. It probably wants to change some of the capabilities of countries to carry out future terrorist acts or acts with weapons of mass destruction. There is an agenda for change in a political sense on both sides of this conflict.
Whose agenda for change is achieving more success and whose is achieving less? Obviously it is too soon to take a final view on this, even with the recent retreat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It seems to me that it's important not to rush to think that everything is over. It isn't all over. It isn't even all over in Afghanistan, since we haven't yet captured Osama bin Laden and his senior associates.
Stand back a bit from the immediate news and reconsider how the world has changed. What can we say about the changes that we can see already?
Let us begin by separating the changes, or potential changes, or indeed in some cases lack of change, into four different categories. The first is those changes that were simply accelerated by September 11th. The second is changes that were happening anyway but whose existence was clarified or revealed by September 11th. The third category is things that are genuinely new, things that really did change and that wouldn't have happened if September 11th hadn't happened; and the fourth category is things that are essentially unchanged by the events of September 11th. This category includes things that haven't yet changed but may still prove to be challenges ahead of us. I'm going to go through the four categories and say what I mean by them.
Accelerated changes
The first change that September 11th accelerated is the world's move into a recession. The major ingredients of a recession were already developing, but September 11th sped up the process by making up the minds of American and other consumers about the need to retrench a little—to pay down some debts and increase their savings. The September 11th events also pushed corporations to go ahead with plans that they'd been thinking about before September 11th, including restructuring, cost-cutting, and asset changes. The result of this is a gathering cloud of recession because of higher joblessness, higher unemployment, and declining consumer spending. Does this mean that the recession is coming faster, and will be deeper than it might have been without September 11th? Not necessarily, though could prove both deeper and shorter than it would have been if all of this hadn't happened. And why do I think that? Partly because an effect of September 11th has been to release governmental fiscal and monetary authorities around the world to take demand stimulation measures that they would probably have been slower doing if September 11th hadn't happened; monetary policy would have been relaxed more slowly, and fiscal policy would have been also probably slower to be released. Also, the decisions by consumers and companies about spending are going to be heavily determined by what happens in the war and whether there are future terrorist attacks. If the war goes well, if there are a series of successes and if there are not further terrorist attacks, I imagine that consumers will resume their spending and halt their adjustment of debt and savings positions rather faster than they might otherwise do. You may well get a quick, psychologically-led bounce-back once the world picture gets clearer.
The second accelerated change is a simple one; an accelerated maturing of the Bush administration in Washington. All new administrations take time to gain their feet. They take time to appoint all their staff, work out what those staff are going to do, and fight out some of the ideological battles that they have. The Bush administration was clearly having those ideological battles. It was clearly finding its feet (and often tripping over them during the summer) but this event has accelerated the process by which it has matured and focused itself on a given task.
The third thing that the events of September 11th have accelerated is the worsening of some stressed or even distressing economic situations around the world. I have two places in mind: Argentina, which has probably been pushed closer to a debt default by September the 11th and the sharper, faster downturn in the US and other markets; and Japan, which was moving back into recession anyway, but whose move has probably been worsened by what has happened. The danger in both cases is that the stress could lead to a fracture and some form of economic collapse in either place. In neither has it yet happened, but September 11th has made the possibility of collapse in those two quite important places become higher.
Changes revealed
What things in my second category do we perhaps understand better following September 11th? The first is the simple fact that we are in a period unprecedented in modern human history in which one country—the United States of America—has such dominance over the world politically, militarily, and, to a lesser extent, economically. In the past when there's been a dominant super- power—Britain or Spain, or generally other European countries—there's been something of a balance of power with regard to other rivals for that crown. The current case where the US is essentially unrivalled in superpower terms is unprecedented, and it has consequences that were put into stark relief on September 11th. It means that the US is a natural target for people around the world who feel that their own situation is not good or who feel excluded. It also means that with such a gigantic military imbalance in the world between the incredibly powerful, technologically- advanced forces of the United States, and everybody else's forces, that those who wish to attack or influence the United States militarily are pushed towards unconventional methods. This is what military analysts call "asymmetric warfare." It means that the world is potentially more dangerous in some ways than it otherwise would be. It seemed safer after the fall of the Cold War because we no longer had the superpower stand-off between the Soviet Union and the West (or the United States). It is good that the stand-off is over, but the result of the absence of the threat of mutually -assured destruction means that potential opponents are always going to be pushed or tempted towards finding more extreme weapons—principally nuclear weapons, but also biological and chemical weapons. This fear about rogue states and their effects on people was the background to the United States' proposed missile defence scheme. The September 11th event confirmed that this fear is indeed the right background for understanding the world and what needs to be done about it. The set of solutions are not easy, but the problems certainly have been clarified.
The second thing that has been clarified is that as a super power of one, you have to work through coalitions of countries because the challenge of preventing such unconventional warfare is so great that it is very difficult to deal with. Others are affected by these threats too, which makes it easier to build the coalitions because everyone fears that they could be victims of unconventional warfare. So multilateralism is absolutely necessary; it is the desirable mode of action for the United States, not for its own sake nor because it's desirable in some moral sense, but because it's a pragmatic way to deal with these common threats.
The third thing that's been clarified by September 11th is the new rapprochement with Russia. It has become clear that Russia has an interest in cooperating with the West and has an interest in economics, an interest in being non- adversarial in most parts of the world, and an interest in dealing with a common terrorist threat. However, given those interests, the West also has an interest in and a need to cooperate with Russia. Fourth and related to this is the cooperation potential with Iran. The West already had closer contacts with the reformist part of the regime in Iran before September 11th, but the events in Afghanistan, plus Iran's own worry about terrorist attacks and attacks from the rival Shia Islamic sect means that Iran has an interest in some sort of rapprochement with the United States and Europe, albeit of a rather standoffish nature. Any rapprochement will be difficult since Iran has been, and continues to be, a sponsor of terrorism itself, particularly in the Middle East. But it has not been a sponsor of the September 11th sort of mega-terrorism, and is itself vulnerable to that terrorism and to instability in the surrounding part of the world.
Finally, I think September 11th clarified some truisms. I will point out two. The first is the importance of political risk in economics and business planning—something that we talked about a lot in the 1970s but has gone out of fashion somewhat since then. The truth is that big economic discontinuities are generally driven by politics rather than by things happening of their own volition in the economy. Political change drove the oil price hikes of the 1970s. The protectionism of the 1920s and '30s was really driven by political change and political events rather than anything economic. And to take a single country as an example, the fall of President Suharto of Indonesia in 1998 after the Asian crisis should have reminded us that when a dictator runs a country, your business contracts are really only worth having as long as that dictator and his acolytes remain in power. As soon as he falls, your contracts are not necessarily going to be fulfilled. What happened in Indonesia was a very sudden drop in the economy after the fall of Suharto. So political risk is absolutely fundamental.
The second truism that was confirmed by September 11th was the error that we in the intellectual punditry community often make when identifying trends and changes in the world (and of course, I exclude The Economist from this error): we often confuse direction and speed. This is very true of the internet, and the boost that information technology was going to bring to all our lives in the late 1990s. The direction was absolutely correct, but the speed was spectacularly over estimated. This is also the case with our post-Cold War era political optimism about the increase in democracy in the world, the spread of liberal values, the falling of communism, and the falling of opposition to liberal democratic capitalism. This optimism is absolutely correct in terms of its direction, but people often overrate the speed with which it is happening and the inevitability with which it takes place. The end of history may have been proclaimed but history has a habit of coming back to bite you in painful places.
New changes
So what has truly changed? What goes into my other two categories: things that have changed that are new, and things that are unchanged that might be future challenges? My list of true changes is short, partly because I put so much into the former, "clarified" category, but I'll list them briefly. One clear change is Pakistan's role and the attitude of the outside world toward Pakistan. Pakistan was a pariah state before September 11th. In some respects it is still a pariah state, but the important thing about it is that it's our pariah state, and we are now going to make a very big effort to turn it away from being a pariah state, because it's also a pariah state with nuclear weapons. The significance of that last fact alone has been brought home. Bill Clinton called Kashmir—the India-Pakistan dispute—the world's most dangerous place. He was right in many ways, but it was difficult before September 11th to deal with that in any serious way. One hope now is that we will move things steadily in the right direction in Pakistan.
The second significant change is a smaller one and took place in Japan. Many people haven't noticed, but after September 11th, Japan finally broke its post-War Peace Constitution and agreed to send war ships to support a military action outside Japan's own territory for the first time. That is a significant change for the future. It is not particularly significant for this conflict, but it will be significant over the long-term. What's also significant is that neither China nor South Korea objected to this, which normally they would.
The third change is that a certain insouciance about the World Trade Organization's prospects, and the need for a World Trade Round of talks was flipped around by September 11th. There was insouciance because the anti-globalization protesters led people to think that backing the WTO wasn't necessarily a good thing to do; freer trade was down the list on people's agenda. That has changed. Good things seem to be coming out of Doha and the WTO meeting there, and there are new prospects for liberalization of agricultural and textile trade being seriously on the agenda for the future. That could only have happened after September 11th when trade went up on the list of priorities as potentially a national security issue, rather than just something that people like me or analysts at the Fraser Institute worry about.
The fourth change is an end to the religion of balanced budgets. Suddenly it's acceptable policy to run big deficits and it's alright to spend a lot more money. I'm not sure whether this will be a good or a bad change, and I think that the ghost of Keynes is probably going to come and haunt us at some point, but nevertheless, I think that is a clear change.
Future challenges
What is unchanged? What are the future challenges? Clearly nation-building in Afghanistan is going to be a future challenge, and I think that it is a challenge that has worried a lot of people. I believe that it is not something that we should get too concerned about. It will be done in a sort of muddled and difficult way as it was in Cambodia, and as it's being done still in East Timor with the UN leading the way, with cooperation from people in the surrounding front- line states. The real issue in Afghanistan is Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, rather than what government takes hold of that country afterwards.
Second: Iraq. Iraq is going to be part of the next phase of the war on terrorism, whether or not you think that military action is necessary against that nation. It's going to be part of the next phase because the status quo with Iraq is a combination of sanctions that make people die but don't make Saddam Hussein fall from power, and no-fly zones policed by fighter planes based in Saudi Arabia. That isn't a good situation. There's a need to change, and it will either be changed by physical military force, or it will be changed by diplomacy.
The third future challenge is the West's relationships with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These two nations are supposedly allies, but they have clearly (advertently or inadvertently) fostered terrorism. A big part of the change that's going to roll out over the next months and years is going to be tentatively feeling our way towards a different relationship with those two countries. In a way, that's something that is both on bin Laden's list and on our own, and it really is too soon to predict the outcome there.
The fourth challenge is Israel and Palestine, which is essentially unchanged by the September 11th events. Possibly it's an intractable problem to deal with, but it's clearly going to have to be on the agenda. Fifth, the same goes for Kashmir, for the relationship between India and Pakistan, although that's nearer a solution than Israel and Palestine.
Conclusion
Those are my categories of change. Am I optimistic about what could come out of this war? Yes, I am. It's a difficult period that's not going to come to an end just because all the beards in Kabul have been shaved off. There will be a long period of adjustment to the new realities of the world. But because of technological change, because of liberal values, because of globalization, the fundamentals of the economy are strong, and the fundamentals of a world led by the United States, but supported by like-minded countries like Canada and Britain and others, should make us optimistic about the prospect of peace in the world as well.
Wine makers have a phrase for the way they feel about their harvests. They say that they are paranoid optimists. They are optimistic that their next harvest is going to be the best ever, that the wine will be the most brilliant vintage ever, but they're paranoid that something will interrupt things to make it imperfect. I think that paranoid optimism is the right approach for thinking about the world we've been in since September 11th.
Questions for Bill Emmott
Fred McMahon: The Economist gave a passing grade (though maybe barely a passing grade) to the United Nations' effort in East Timor. How well do you think they can do rebuilding Afghanistan?
Bill Emmott: The answer, as with everything to do with the United Nations, depends not on the UN as an organization, but on the will of its members. The UN has no divisions to carry its tasks out. It really depends on whether its members are going to give it the resources to make rebuilding possible. You can divide the effort into several categories. Will there be adequate peace-keeping forces, troops, and military assets? I think the answer to that is yes; they will be supplied by members of the front-line coalition. Probably they'll be led particularly by Turkish troops so that there will be Muslims taking action. The second and much more difficult part is the necessary institution-building, such as a civil service and some set of institutions for Afghanistan. That's tougher and will, I think, tax the UN's ability and the patience of the coalition for many more years in the future. On that, I have to be agnostic about the prospects for success, but there is a will to try. Further, there is a strong agreement between Iran and Pakistan in particular that both want stability in that country; they think that something better needs to be built, which is a very important precondition for progress, even if not for a real solution.
FM : What is your view about how worthwhile the sanctions are against Iraq, and what should be done in general about Iraq?
BE: That is a difficult question. I think that basically sanctions have been a mistake, but they were an understandable mistake. With hindsight, the first mistake was stopping the military campaign so early and leaving Saddam Hussein in power. It was an understandable mistake because of pressure from neighbouring countries to stop the war and not topple Iraq's dictator and not cause instability there. Turkey was worried. Saudi Arabia was worried. Others were worried.
But that then led to a regime that was meant to be held in check by a combination of UN inspections and sanctions. It was the same mistake that was made after the First World War with the Treaty of Versailles. It gave Saddam Hussein the ability to turn the tables on us in propaganda terms, given that he didn't care about the condition of his people, and all he needed was enough resources to rebuild his military and keep control over his people. Sanctions have been a mistake because they have been ineffective, and they've helped him turn the propaganda campaign against us.
What will happen? I think it really depends on whether there is plausible and credible evidence of Iraqi involvement in al-Qaeda's terrorist network or in the recent Anthrax attacks. If there is such credible evidence, then I think that there will be a military campaign against Iraq. If there isn't such evidence, then I think that there will be a resumption of diplomatic action— this time with Russia on side—probably proposing new adaptations to the sanctions to take away some of Saddam's propaganda capability, but also reactivating the UN's pressure to research Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.
FM : What do you think about dollarization of the Canadian economy to the US dollar?
BE: Let me start with Britain because it is what I know most about. The decision to adopt a common currency is essentially a political decision rather than an economic one. The economics of membership of the single currency do not provide a compelling case either for or against the euro; they are marginal, either way. It would not be a disaster for Britain to be a member of the single currency. We would benefit in some ways, probably with lower interest rates, a more easily-planned investment climate for companies, and selling in the single market, but we would lose in other ways, such as in losing the flexibility provided by a floating currency and by losing a policy targeted more precisely to the particular conditions of Britain. The economic evidence is that the pros and cons are pretty marginal. The essential questions are political, and are about participation in a larger political unit, about influencing those decisions, about taking collective action with neighbours rather than taking individual action as a country. So my answer is to apply those criteria to Canada. I don't think the economic pluses and minuses would give you a clear answer either way about dollarization. There'd be some benefits, and there would also be some costs. I don't think it's very clear which would be better. Obviously the Canadian domestic economic policy has to adjust to the new environment and that introduces new elements into the calculation. The basic question is: do you want to give up the political control that the currency provides? Do you think that there is benefit from becoming an associate of the country that does have the dollar, the United States? I would guess the answer to that is pretty clear. So I would be against.
FM : Is this a war against Islam or a war between cultures? What is the future of Saudi Arabia, and how does all this play into oil prices?
BE: This is not a war against Islam. It is a war against terrorists. However, the failures of the Islamic countries' regimes mean that there has been an increased temptation to gather power through more and more extreme Islamic doctrine by claiming absolute knowledge. So this is a war against the failure of some parts of the Islamic world that then finds its expression in militant Islamism. Christianity has had these characteristics at some stages in its history. The idea of absolute knowledge and single truths has been the background to many conflicts we've had in the past, so that it's not something that's unique to Islam, but it is special to Islam at this moment.
Saudi Arabia is a complete mystery to me. It is a mystery partly because although the Saudis complain vigorously about their treatment in the media, they don't actually allow journalists to go to Saudi Arabia to find out what's going on. For many of the past 10 years, that has included journalists from The Economist. We have had people there, but not very often. It's a very opaque society. Clearly, there is a very awkward sort of Faustian pact there between the Royal Family with its privileges, decadence, and power, and the money that they've given to the Islamic sects that has fostered some of the militancy. There isn't a sign that it's currently unstable or about to change. I do think that to the West's point of view, detachment from Saudi Arabia is important because there is a risk that by being too close and too interventionist in Saudi Arabia and supporting the regime, we will bring about its collapse. I think it's going to be a very uncomfortable period for Saudi Arabia, and I'm still trying to work out how that's going to develop in future. But we will, I think, try to step back as much as we can from Saudi Arabia.
As for oil prices, unless there's a collapse in Saudi Arabia and somebody malign getting a grip on those reserves, I think that oil prices will be weak in the near term because of the fall in demand, and the fact that Russia is clearly inclined to increase its market share, both of which will help the North American consumer. There is a danger that oil prices could collapse, causing problems for Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern regimes. There will be strong efforts to try to manage that, but it is a market, and markets often aren't manageable.
FM: The other big change to which you referred in your talk is Russia. What should the West do to help, and what is your long-term view? Optimistic or pessimistic?
BE: Well, my long-term view is optimistic about Russia, but I wouldn't mortgage my house and put all my money on that long-term view. Russia is still a state without secure institutions and without a secure rule of law. It still has some characteristics of a gangster state where crime and criminal groups have excessive power over the state, and where the institutions of the state are weak. So the country still has the potential to go in a bad direction. Also, there are factions within Russia who still see Russia's dealings with the West as being a zero-sum game rather than offering the potential for mutual benefit. But the balance has swung towards mutual benefit, and generally, Russia is moving in the right direction. Again, though, one shouldn't make the mistake of assuming that just because it's going in the right direction that it's doing so rapidly, because it isn't. Nor is that move towards institution building, towards the rule of law, towards a more properly running market economy one that's going to be without bumps. But basically, if you forced me to make a bet on whether in 10 years Russia will be more prosperous, friendlier to the West, and have more trade and investment links with all our countries, my answers would all be yes.
FM: What's the future of the airline industry in Canada and the rest of the world?
BE: It really does depend on terrorism. The airline industry has always been a cyclical industry. It has high fixed costs and needs high capacity utilization to make it work, so it always suffers badly in recessions and this one is no exception. Clearly, the new ingredient is terrorism and the extra worries that that has produced. If there is no future terrorism of the September 11th kind, and there's no future confirmation of the danger of flying, then I think that in a natural, cyclical way the airline industry will rebound. I hope that out of this difficult period that there will be some breaking of the national regulatory structure that has throttled the industry and prevented cross-border consolidation from happening, particularly within Europe where airlines have been preserved as national champions with uneconomic structures.
FM: You mentioned you were optimistic about our economy in the long term because of the deepening of markets and technology. Over the short-term, how will the twin problems of corporate debt and technological overinvestment, together with consumer debt play out?
BE: It comes back to my feeling that September 11th has accelerated a process that was already under way. The effect may well be that the resumption of investment and spending happens more quickly than it otherwise would have. The recession has forced consumers in particular to take a hard look at their debts, and probably start to adjust quite quickly. Companies that had already been adjusting for the previous 12 months (and there had already been a big adjustment of inventory and a big adjustment in investment) were already quite a long way through that cycle. We'll see more evidence of financial distress—more situations like Enron and other bankruptcies I'm sure as the process plays out—but we have to remember that the investment adjustment process really began about 12 months ago. So we're already quite a way through the process.
FM: A number of people are curious about Britain's role in all this. What is Tony Blair up to?
BE: First, Tony Blair is following quite a traditional British line of close and supportive relations with the United States. He is also taking on a role of political prominence in the world. That role, perhaps, is more accepted from a British prime minister because of our history and because it doesn't seem redolent of all sorts of ulterior motives—at least for most people. British prime ministers are more inclined to do this kind of thing than other leaders, and to a degree, Tony Blair is just following that path. Second, Mr. Blair is a man of great moral and religious conviction. In the passion and magnitude and amplification of what he's done, I think perhaps you're seeing some of his own personality coming out. Third, it is popular to be doing this, so he's not taking a big political risk by doing it, at least not at the moment. Indeed, it's easier to do this kind of thing than it is to reform the British Health Service, so that I guess he's having a better time than he used to before September 11th. But actually, Britain has been quite complacent about its vulnerability to terrorism, probably because of the threat of Irish terrorism over the last 30 years and the sense that it is a familiar challenge to Britain. This is true, except that the IRA never used nuclear weapons and never used massive weapons of destruction. Tony Blair deserves more criticism for his inattentiveness on this front than he has so far received. Britain has been complacent in putting proper protection around nuclear power stations, for example. The IRA was terrible but they never really did anything of such magnitude that it was going to be totally life changing for the nation. Tony Blair has been a bit complacent about the potential for such destruction in the midst of all of this.
FM: Do you think terrorists will have obtained, or will obtain, weapons of mass destruction?
BE: I don't know. The right policy response is to assume that they have, or that they could, because if they haven't and we take precautions against it then we won't have lost badly, whereas if they have, then we will at least benefit from some of those precautions. Of course the policies that follow from that judgement are not easy to implement and we can never be absolutely sure that we are safe against such terror. We need policies that are a combination of clearer and stronger anti-proliferation regimes and inspections, but in particular, we need the cooperative alliances and diplomacy that give us a chance of enforcing these regimes. Russia, Pakistan, and India, and anyone who has nuclear materials needs to be brought into that process in order to increase the possibility that we will be able to enforce. Currently, we have great treaties but terrible enforcement. This has to change.
This edited introduction of Bill Emmott was given by Mr. Garfield Mitchell, Executive Director of the Weston Foundation.
Bill Emmott studied politics,
philosophy and economics at Magdalen College, Oxford, before he moved to
Nuffield College to do post-graduate research on the French Communists
party's spell in government from 1944 to 1947. Before completing his research,
however, he joined The Economist's Brussels office, writing about EEC affairs
and the Benelux countries. Thus began his long career with the world's
leading weekly magazine on current affairs and business. In 1982, Mr. Emmott
became the paper's economics correspondent in London, before moving to
Tokyo the following year to cover Japan and South Korea. In mid-1986, he
returned to London as financial editor; in 1989 he became business affairs
editor, responsible for all of the paper's coverage of business, finance,
and science. Mr. Emmott was appointed Editor of The Economist in March
1993. He has written three books on Japan, two of which have become bestsellers:
The Sun Also Sets: The Limits to Japan's Economic Power and Japan's Global
Reach: The Influence, Strategies, and Weaknesses of Japan's Multinational
Corporations.
The Economist Editor Bill Emmott spoke to a Fraser Institute
audience in Toronto on November 14. Fraser Institute Director of the Centre
for the Study of Globalization and Trade, Mr. Fred McMahon, chaired the
event.
info@fraserinstitute.ca
4th Floor, 1770 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6J 3G7
Tel: (604) 688-0221 Fax: (604) 688-8539 Book Orders: 1-800-665-3558 ext. 580
You can contact us at the above email address for any comments or information requests. Please report any dead links or technical problems.