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February 2002New Policies for War and Peaceby Barry Cooper & David Bercuson The announcement that Canadian troops will proceed to Afghanistan in order to operate alongside US forces and under American command may indicate the revival of an honourable Canadian tradition. It certainly points to a dilemma at least a century old. A hundred years ago, Canadian troops, including the Strathconas, elements of which are going to Afghanistan, were fighting beside British troops and under British command during the Boer War. Canadians took part because the government of the day, under Wilfrid Laurier, sought to increase Canadian influence within the British Empire. In effect, Britain was the sun around which Canada revolved, but there was considerable uncertainty among Canadians over how far from that sun this country should orbit. The great debate about Canadian sovereignty during the first three decades of the twentieth century reflected two contradictory points of view. Laurier and his Tory successor, Robert Borden, believed Canada would gain autonomy by participating fully in Imperial affairs. Borden ensured a significant Canadian place at the post-War peace table because of this country's contributions on the western front during the First World War. The opposing viewpoint, championed by William Lyon Mackenzie King, held that Canada would gain autonomy by keeping its distance from the UK and especially from Imperial defense planning. It, too, was effective, as the 1932 Statute of Westminster, which gave Canada its legal independence from Britain, eloquently testifies. These two opposed but equally successful policies reflected two different sets of circumstances: war and peace. The United States is today even more powerful compared to the rest of the world than Britain was a century ago. The dilemma for Canada remains as it was, and today reasonable Canadians disagree about the optimal radius of the Canadian orbit around the American sun. Three recent and contradictory actions taken by the Chrétien government express the problem, but as yet do nothing to resolve it. First, the imminent deployment of Canadian troops to Afghanistan opens a new chapter in Canada's relationship to the US. Canadians have operated under American command before, on land, at sea, and in the air. But Canadian ground forces have never done so on a straight bilateral basis. In other words, all previous Canadian commitments of ground forces alongside Americans or under their command have been part of NATO operations or part of a coalition of countries formed for specific military objectives, such as the Gulf War of 1991. The Canadian army is now about to follow where the navy and air force have led. The army deployment, however, is far more significant because ground troops remain the essential element in warfare, and because the army is by far the largest branch of the Canadian Forces. Second, although the current government made a number of ill-considered gestures in the direction of expressing Canadian autonomy following the terrorist attacks of last September, Canada has been fully compliant in meeting the requests of the Americans in matters of border security, internal security, and changes to refugee policy. In short, the government said "no" to a North American security perimeter even as it was taking steps to put one in place. Whatever these decisions say about domestic politics, they have been ground-breaking in terms of Canadian-American relations. Third, the government threw a few table scraps to the Canadian Forces in the December budget. The Prime Minster defended his wretched refusal to spend what was needed by attacking his critics as representatives of the arms industry, the fabled "merchants of death." He did so despite growing American impatience with previous Canadian defense cutbacks and with the current level of the defense budget. Defense spending, in short, looked like business as usual. These contradictions reflect a deeper issue, namely, how twenty-first-century Canada should come to grips with what the French call a "hyperpower." Over the past five years, the government has floated a number of ideas including a common currency, a customs union, even water sales and common energy policy. But in almost every case, bold announcements were followed by qualifications, denials, and then no real changes in policy. The pull of the United States is inexorable. Canadians are well aware of it, and by and large welcome the prospect of closer ties with the US. At the same time, polls show Canadians have no desire to become Americans, and Americans certainly have no aspirations to digest Canada. It is clear that strong leadership, which can come only from Ottawa, is needed to chart the course this country must take in the years ahead. Heretofore the government has been both uncertain and contradictory. Perhaps the troop commitments indicate a new decisiveness and a new realism.
Barry Cooper is Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary and Director of The Fraser Institute's Alberta office. David Bercuson is Professor of History, University of Calgary and Director of the Calgary Institute for Strategic and Military Studies. This article was first published by the Calgary Herald on Jan 7, 2002.
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