Volume 4, Number 6

CANADIAN AND AMERICAN NETWORK TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE GULF WAR: An Extension of "Radio Iraq"?

During the Gulf war, television reporters revealed that their stories were subject to the approval of various censors. On 19 January, CTV's Jim Munson explained: "Canada has its own set of rules. Media analysts consider them far more stringent than necessary, ensuring that reporters will all say the same thing."

Taking this limitation on the press one step further, the CBC's 6 February "Journal" discussed the role of propaganda in the Gulf War. The introductory report, "Creating Consensus," presented the thesis that all sides in a war manipulate the media to achieve a "fighting justification."

Included in the discussion of that day's program was the argument that the media should not be blamed for deficiencies in war coverage. The first segment ended with CBC's Paul McGrath stating: "Understanding that they [the media] are caught in the middle of this war of words, and images can teach us at least one valuable lesson and that is, that in a war in which both sides are strictly regulating information to maintain consensus, all information therefore is tainted. All of it must be taken with at least a shaker full of salt."

In that story, governments were said to employ three themes to create consensus for a war: 1) we are the victims; they are the aggressors; 2) we are good; they are evil; and 3) we are strong; they are weak. This On Balance examines whether television did create allied consensus about the Gulf War. Were the major television networks in North America relating the U.N. forces' viewpoint, or were they an extension of "Radio Iraq"?

To answer these questions we have examined all statements made about the Gulf war on the national newscasts of CBC and CTV. This content analysis will be compared to a similar one conducted by the Center for Media and Public Policy in Washington which examined ABC, CBS, and NBC coverage of the war.

ON CBC, THEY ARE GOOD, WE ARE EVIL

With the exception of CTV, both Canadian and American television paid a significant amount of attention to Saddam Hussein. On U.S. television, coverage of the Iraqi leader was overwhelmingly negative (88 percent). On CBC, although the balance of coverage was more unfavourable than favourable toward Saddam Hussein, 39 percent of the appraisals were positive. In contrast, only 21 percent of Saddam Hussein's attention on CTV was favourable.

Click here to view Figure A: Evaluations of Saddam Husein

On both U.S. and Canadian television, praise for Saddam Hussein came mostly from Iraqi, Palestinian and Jordanian sources. On the 24 January CBS News, a Jordanian woman was shown saying: "Saddam Hussein is good...I love Saddam Hussein." Similarly, on 7 February, Lloyd Robertson reported that Jordanians supported Iraq: "Today, some Jordanians felt it was the time to act like an ally." While both American and Canadian television networks mentioned that Saddam Hussein had supporters in the Jordanian and Palestinian populations, none made the case as often as CBC.

This finding provokes the question, Did CTV and the U.S. networks unconditionally accept the U.N. coalition position and produce their stories accordingly, or was the CBC so concerned that it provide balanced coverage that it presented Saddam Hussein's position in too positive a light?

CBC Describes Iraqi Defeats as Gains, American Victories Losses

In the month-and-a-half long war, a total of 101 statements praising Saddam Hussein were aired on CBC compared to only 16 such statements on all the U.S. networks and 18 such statements on CTV. While many of these statements were demonstrations of his allies' support, a disturbing trend emerged in CBC's analysis of the war. Specifically, losses on the Iraqi side were seen as victories, while victories for the Allies were seen as politically tentative. On the 3 February "National," Terry Milewski presented this argument: "For Americans, the daily toll of war-even when it's going well-is provoking renewed debate on the home front about the aims of war and about how long it has to last. . . . There is also increasing concern that every day he survives, the Iraqi leader is becoming more of a hero in the Arab world-turning military defeat into political victory."

Similarly, on 22 January, Dan Bjarnason reported: "As for the bombing of Baghdad, while the Pentagon

"Saddam Hussein is good . . . I love Saddam Hussein."

says multi-national air attacks are precise and aimed only at military targets, the effect could be to rally support behind Saddam Hussein." And on 30 January, Patrick Brown reported: "For some, it was more like a victory celebration than a protest march. News that Iraq has taken the war into the coalition camp with its thrust into Saudi Arabia was an occasion for dancing in the streets-regardless of the final outcome of the first ground engagement of the war, regardless of Iraqi losses. A counter-attack after facing overwhelming air assault for two weeks confirms Saddam Hussein as a hero here [Jordan]. The coalition forces are far from heroes."

Even at the end of the war, Saddam Hussein was portrayed as victorious. Paul Workman reported on 28 February: "There was no cheering among Palestinians who made Saddam Hussein's war into their war. And his humiliating loss into a symbolic victory." Workman offered the statement from a man-on-the-street interview as evidence: "You consider he lost it. But we consider that he won it, because he refused to be a pillow to the United States and to the European countries."

This was not the only time CBC put a positive spin on a negative event. On 23 January the top story of the day was Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Israel. In the sixth story, CBC provided the Jordanian perspective on the war. What is significant in this report is not that a Jordanian perspective is presented, but

". . . every day he survives, the Iraqi leader is becoming more of a hero in the Arab world-turning military defeat into political victory."

that a Scud attack on Israel could lead to statements which provide emotional arguments about the civilian damage in Iraq. Peter Mansbridge introduced the story in the following manner: "Every Scud attack on Israel scores points for Saddam Hussein in neighbouring Jordan. Most Jordanians are Palestinian. For them, Saddam Hussein is fighting to liberate their Palestine. For them, the U.S.-led coalition is bombing Iraqi women and children." What is provocative about this statement is that no where in the story or in the preceding stories was the effect of the Scud missiles on Israeli women and children mentioned despite the fact that the night before, Scud missiles had killed Israeli civilians. Instead, Joe Schlesinger reported: "Here in Amman, the news of the latest missile attack on Israel was greeted with the wish for more.

Man: "We wish to Saddam to achieve what he is longing for, just to destroy these son-of-a-bitch people in Israel."

ON CBC, ANALYSTS DESCRIBE GEORGE BUSH AS OBSESSIONAL

On CBC, George Bush received less than one fifth of the attention that Saddam Hussein received. CTV and the U.S. networks also gave the American president less attention than they gave to the Iraqi leader.

On Canadian television, the majority of attention towards George Bush was negative. 84 percent of CBC's evaluations of Bush were unfavourable. On CTV, negative statements comprised 67 percent of his evaluations. These figures translate to an increase in the proportion of negative attention paid to the American leader from the crisis period before the war. [Prior to the war, Canadian television's coverage of George Bush was not quite as negative. CBC was twice as likely to report negative as positive statements of the American president, CTV reported slightly more positive than negative assessments.] Only on American television did positive assessments about Bush outnumber negative assessments (56 percent).

Click here to view Figure B: Evaluations of George Bush

While many of the negative comments directed at Bush were from Iraqi sources portraying him as the "devil," the "enemy of God," or the "friend of the devil," some Western analysts assessed Bush's involvement in the war on a personal level. On 1 March, CBC provided commentators who speculated on his personal motives. Elizabeth Drew, who was introduced as the "respected Washington reporter for The New Yorker magazine" made the following analysis: "There's been an enormous amount of speculation about what was going on in Bush's head during this entire time, and why was it an issue of principle. And I know Senators who would meet with him and see that he would be quite indignant about Kuwait, but also be a little bit troubled about what they saw and felt was an obsession, a personal obsession, with Saddam Hussein. And I think that . . . a big part of this story, is when did this issue of principle also become, or was it always all along also a sort of personal issue that the president had." In the previous story, Roger Fisher, who teaches negotiation techniques to diplomats at Harvard Law School, said, "I'm afraid the President was afraid to negotiate. He was willing now in the war to kill thousands of defenceless people, but afraid to negotiate."

WE ARE STRONG; THEY ARE WEAK

The only theme outlined in "Creating Consensus," that was presented by all major networks, was that we are strong and they are weak. Coalition superiority was uniformly reported during the war. Canadian and American television reports about the U.S. military praised their capabilities. Almost three out of four CBC, two out of four CTV and 9 out of 10 statements on American network news was positive about the U.S. military.

Click here to view Figure C: Assessing Allied Military Strength

Many of these assessments praised the strengths of the American weapons. For example, on 16 January, Paul McGrath reported: "The F-15 known as the Eagle, and the F-16 known as the Falcon, are all fast, heavily-loaded fighter jets." The Patriot missile received the most attention and its efficacy was often reported. For example, on 23 January, CTV's Martin Himel reported on the first use of the American-made Patriot in Israel: "The Iraqi missile was making its way towards Israel when American Patriot rockets fired out over the northern parts of the country to intercept the incoming Scud. This time the Patriots scored. The Scud was blown out of the sky. It came as a welcome relief for Israelis, especially after last night's devastating attack."

Even the Canadian forces received favourable attention. For example, on 20 February, "The National's" Martin Seamungal reported: "Canadian versions of this 'dumb bomb' are used every day by the American fighters based here. They're called 'dumb bombs' because they aren't laser- or radar-guided. But the Air Force says the CF-18's sophisticated sight system is accurate to 50 feet."

95 percent of American television's attention to its military was favourable. For example, on the CBS news of 17 January, Dan Rather summarized the first full day of the war: "In sports page language-this is not a sport, it's war-but, so far, it's a blowout." Of that coverage, the U.S. Air force received the most praise.

It is interesting to note that while U.S. network news gave their own military overwhelming support, they also provided more favourable commentary about the Iraqi military than did Canadian television. On American television, a full 42 percent of the assessments made about the Iraqi military were positive. In contrast, only 31 percent of CBC and 28 percent of CTV assessments about the Iraqi military were favourable.

Click here to view Figure D: Assessing Iraqi Military Strength

The Center for Media and Public Affairs notes that most of the positive commentary about the Iraqi military was reported early in the war. On 20 January, a U.S. military briefer stated that Iraq possessed "some of the most formidable air defenses ever encountered." The Center noted that during the first week of the war, more than three out of five such estimations of Iraqi strength were positive. However, as the war progressed, the American media's description of the Iraqi military was increasingly less respectful. Ultimately, the Iraqi military bacame the butt of jokes. Media Monitor quotes an NBC military analyst who stated on 21 February: "That an entire battalion would surrender to a bunch of helicopters certainly writes a new chapter in military history."

THEY ARE THE VICTIMS; WE ARE THE AGGRESSORS

All major North American networks depicted the Americans as the aggressors and Iraq as the victim. Given the overwhelming success of the Allied coalition, it does not come as too much of a surprise that the Americans were portrayed in such a light.

Figure E depicts the coverage the various players and their policies received. Included in the description of policy is the bombing of military and civilian targets. In both Canada and the United States, American actions received the most coverage. Twice as many unfavourable as favourable comments about U.S. policy were heard. The most damaging was the U.S. bombing of an alleged civilian shelter which the American government insisted was a military command control centre. On 13 February, Brent Sadler of the British network ITN gave this report on CBC: "If there was one place of safety to survive the blitz of Baghdad, it should have been this purpose-built shelter. It was clearly hit twice because the points of bomb injury through thick reinforced concrete were unmistakable. Explosions at one end of the bunker turned the structure into a giant furnace, incinerating those inside."

Click here to view Figure E: Rating Policy

Similarly, on the same day, Lloyd Robertson announced on the "CTV News": "Good evening. What we saw today wasn't like anything we've seen so far in the Gulf War. It wasn't those blurred black and white pictures of a military strike. It was a vivid scene of horror and death. Coalition bombs fell on a bunker in Baghdad-the Iraqis say

"Standing here, in the midst of this wasteland of war, mile after mile of carnage, it's impossible to imagine that Saddam Hussein will ever be able to fight again."

it was an air raid shelter, the Americans say it was a military command center. Whatever it was, it was filled with civilians. Iraqi officials say up to a thousand people were killed, most of them women and children." Near the end of the newscast, CTV's Leslie Jones echoed that report by saying: "But as casualties mount, there is increasing concern that coalition bombing is excessive."

Apart from the bombing of the shelter, the sheer strength of the American military in the conflict translated to it being depicted as a bully. For example on the 1 March "Journal" Jeremy Thompson reported: "Like scavengers checking on their prey, allied helicopter gunships wield over this graveyard, a hillside where the Iraqis' belief in their military might had finally perished. It truly was the killing field of Kuwait. This is all that remains of the world's fourth most powerful army. Standing here, in the midst of this wasteland of war, mile after mile of carnage, it's impossible to imagine that Saddam Hussein will ever be able to fight again."

PREDICTING THE FUTURE

In the May issue of On Balance we examined predictions made about the war during the crisis period and compared them to actual outcomes. During the war, the practice of predicting the future continued.

As the war progressed, predictions became less accurate. Prior to the war, predictions were twice as likely to be accurate as inaccurate. However, during the war, predictions made by sources and journalists had only a 50/50 chance of being correct. As a point of interest, one reason why accuracy of the pre-war predictions was so high was because of the almost unanimous view that there would be war-154 statements on CBC and 82 on CTV predicted war. When those predictions are excluded, the success rate prior to the war was only 56 percent for CBC and 54 percent for CTV.

CANADIAN AND U.S. TELEVISION FOCUS ON DIFFERENT SOURCES

On American television, military representatives comprised the most frequently mentioned source accounting for over one quarter of all interviewee statements. In contrast, the use of military personnel on Canadian television accounted for only 12 and 15 percent respectively, of CBC and CTV sources' statements.

Canadian Networks Use Experts More Frequently Than U.S. Networks

One striking difference in the type of sources used in Canadian and American coverage of the Gulf war was the use of experts. On American network television, experts accounted for only 2 percent of overall sources' statements. On Canadian network television news, experts comprised 16 percent of interviewee statements.

Click here to view Figure F: War Sources

U.S. television was less likely than Canadian television to use allied sources. CTV used most allied representatives comprising almost one-fifth of their coverage. CBC's use of allies comprised 12 percent of total coverage.

On American network television, experts accounted for only 2 percent of overall sources' statements.

On American TV, the allies represented 8 percent of total attention. The lack of attention to the allies by U.S. network television is underscored by the finding that, "Among foreign sources, Iraqis were quoted most frequently, more than all of the United States' coalition partners combined (495 to 447 citations)." [Media Monitor (1991) "The Instant Replay War," April, p.3.]

U.S. government sources, however received more attention on CTV than they did on the American networks or on CBC. American government representatives accounted for 16 percent of CTV, 10 percent of CBC and 14 percent of American source statements.

Although differences existed between the networks, there were some patterns of similarity. Neither country's media quoted congressional sources in high frequencies.

TV'S TOP STORY

In analyzing American television's coverage of the war, the Centre for Media and Public Affairs found that: "War coverage averaged 14 stories lasting 25 minutes per network per night, more than the entire normal network evening newscast." A similar pattern emerged in Canadian network news where CBC averaged 11 stories per night and CTV averaged 9 stories per night. Many times the "Journal" was almost exclusively devoted to the war.

Click here to view Figure G: Amount of War News

Of the topics discussed about the war, conflict dominated the airwaves. Over half of overall coverage described the conflict. During the first week of the war, descriptions of battle comprised 64 percent of CTV and 62 percent of CBC overall attention. For example, on 17 January, CBC's Martin Seamungal reported: "The roar of jets shook Qatar throughout the night. U.S. fighters, based here, thundered into battle, while Canada's CF-18s flew missions to protect Canadian ships in the Gulf." Simi-

Over half of overall coverage described the conflict. During the first week of the war, descriptions of battle comprised 64 percent of CTV and 62 percent of CBC overall attention.

larly, at the start of the war, Lloyd Robertson announced on 16 January: "This first attack of the Gulf war was carried out mainly by U.S. F-15 fighter bombers. They were accompanied by a squadron of British tornado ground attack air craft. The American jets could be seen and heard taking off throughout the night from Saudi Arabia."

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

"A colleague just passed me a copy of your IV, 5 May 1991 issue, which I read with considerable interest. I was particularly intrigued by your Table 1 (Selected Predictions). Absent from your otherwise very comprehensive list was the subject of terrorism.

We [Centre for Conflict Studies] were asked for predictions on whether there would be terrorism on 22 occasions, or about 22.5 percent of the time; in fact, it was the one subject we were asked about consistently-the other interviews ranged over a whole variety of subjects. The fact that we were asked so often (4 out of the 6 U.S. interviews were on this subject) probably reflected the fact that our Centre is known regionally, if not nationally as a Centre of expertise on that subject."

Dr. David Charters, Director,
Centre for Conflict Studies

RESPONSE

The question of Iraqi terrorism was indeed an issue which we captured in our content analysis. However, it was not a prediction which was made very often in the national newscasts of CBC and CTV.

A total of 9 statements on CBC and 5 statements on CTV assessed the possibility of terrorism. Six of those on CBC (66 percent) and 4 (80 percent) on CTV thought that there would be terrorist action taken by Iraq.

METHODOLOGY

Results on the Gulf War are based on census samples of 257 "National," 151 "Journal," 45 "Sunday Report," and 2 "Venture" stories as well as 350 "CTV National News" stories from January 16 to March 2. All stories appearing during that time were coded, representing a total population rather than a random sample of stories.

Three researchers were employed in coding the news stories. The researchers were selected on the basis of their differing political views. To assess the clarity of the research instrument and measure consistency, tests of inter-coder reliability were conducted throughout the procedure. A high level of intercoder reliability (0.82) was obtained.

The American data was compiled by the Center for Media and Public Affairs. The U.S. data is based on 1,733 ABC, CBS and NBC evening newscasts broadcast on the Gulf War.

Further information or details on the coding design and methods used on the Canadian data may be obtained by contacting the National Media Archive.

For copies of the American study contact the Center for Media and Public Affairs, 2101 L Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20037.

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Last Modified: Wednesday, October 20, 1999.