Volume 8, Number 10 - December, 1995

From Over Confidence to Crisis: How English Language TV Favoured the Federalist Position in the 1995 Quebec Referendum

AT THE TIME OF WRITING, PRIME MINISTER JEAN Chretien has spoken out against the French-language coverage of the Quebec referendum campaign. He charges, among other things, that Radio-Canada was biased against the federalist position. In response, the CBC's new president, Perrin Beatty, has requested that an outside agency examine the coverage.

Charges of media bias are not new to referendum campaigns, or indeed to election campaigns. Nor is this the first time that the media's coverage of this particular campaign has been the subject of discussion. For example, in a Globe and Mail editorial, "The press corps' double standard," columnist Andre Picard argues that, on the whole, the francophone media have been balanced in their coverage of the issue. There may well have been an equal number of stories on each campaign, but as we reveal in our content analysis of English-language television coverage of the referendum, there is more than one way in which imbalance can be shown.

On the surface, networks balanced attention to "Yes" and "No"

Simply looking at the amount of coverage of the "Yes" and "No" camps does not tell the whole story of the campaign. In fact, CBC almost exactly balanced the amount of attention to the sovereignists and the federalists. CTV gave slightly more attention to the sovereignists (56.2 percent). However, of that coverage, the networks' commentaries were much more critical of the separatist than of the federalist position.

English-language TV favoured "No" arguments

Excluding horse-race or campaign strategies, the coverage of the arguments for and against the referendum question clearly placed the English-language television networks in favour of the federalist campaign. As figure A shows, while almost as much attention was placed on each argument, the unity team were given more opportunity to present their arguments favourably than were the separatists. On both networks, arguments against Quebec sovereignty were presented twice as frequently as arguments in favour of sovereignty. In contrast, the outpouring of views in favour of federalism were presented twice as frequently as the dissenting opinions on both networks.

Was English-language TV a pawn of the federalist strategies?

As was the case in the coverage of the First Ministers during the Meech Lake crisis, television played an integral part in fostering the sense of crisis. To be sure, the Quebec referendum campaign was not always depicted in this light. During September in the otherwise "unofficial" campaign, and even during the first three weeks of the "official" campaign, English-language television portrayed the "No" forces as well organized and assured of a relatively easy win. In contrast, the networks emphasized the stalls and sputters of the sovereignist campaign.

For example, alleged dirty dealings by the PQ and the separatists over a supposedly leaked document embarrassing the Liberals was the focus of the networks' attention at the start of the second week in September. Mark Kelley concluded his September 17 "Sunday Report" story with the theme that the strategies of the campaign were what mattered and that the separatists' strategy was clearly not working: "But brave words alone can't bury a bad week. The sovereignists were kept on the defensive, and then hit with the poor poll results. Nearly three days of debate left here at the National Assembly and clearly, they'll need a stronger performance to help boost their confidence and get their campaign back."

On CTV's program on September 21, 1995, the thrust of Rosemary Thompson's story was also on the problems in the "Yes" camp: "PQ caucus members say as they drive though the province, they see `No' posters lining the streets, and on buses; and they're worried the `Yes' team is getting off to a slow start. It's been a tough week. It began with the news that the `Yes' side is trailing in the polls. Then accusations started flying in the National Assembly that the government is hiding studies that don't paint a rosy future of life after sovereignty. So yesterday when the debate ended, some members of the Parti Quebecois caucus wanted to know where the campaign is going. And while the `Yes' team says its three-party coalition is its biggest asset, it's also created some difficulties."

"Official" referendum coverage continues to favour federalists

Kudos for the "No" side and the gaffe watch over the "Yes" camp did not stop when the official battle began. It took until the final week of the campaign for the assessments of the strategies of the two camps to reverse. Some of the analysis by reporters betrayed their exuberance over the federalist campaign. For example on the October 4, 1995 "CTV News," Rosemary Thompson reported: "In a conversation with reporters, Dumont, leader of the Action Democratique, said he's frustrated with the defeatist attitude of some members of the `Yes' camp." Craig Oliver repeated the bravado of the federalists in his October 6, 1995 report: "These federalist campaigners believe they have a decisive victory within their grasp, and only some unforeseen accident can ruin it for them." And Sandie Rinaldo on the same night contradicted a statement by Parizeau by bringing up a poll result: "He's [Parizeau] promising negotiations on political and economic association. But the Committee may not be needed. A new poll by Leger and Leger shows the federalists leading, although it is a close race."

CBC was also guilty of favouring the federalist campaign in the first three weeks. On the October 1, 1995 "National" for example, Tom Kennedy made this observation: "Optimistic words from the leader [Parizeau] whose sovereignty option has been trailing up to ten points in the opinion polls." Mark Kelley reported on October 3, 1995: "But if nothing else, these attacks have kept him [Parizeau] on the defensive, and knocked his campaign off course."

In her October 8, 1995 report, CBC's Lynne Robson discounted Bouchard's entry into the campaign: "But despite the excitement over Bouchard's presence, even some convinced sovereignists are convinced that Bouchard won't be able to save the campaign." And on the same night CBC's Tom Kennedy provided this analysis: "The perfect image to describe the beginning of the sovereignist campaign. A campaign bus that kept breaking down, worn out media people waiting for things to roll. As for Jacques Parizeau's message: `They say we're incapable of building a country,' he tells Quebecers again and again, `that we're too small'. But he adds, `they are wrong.' But as was often the case this week, the crowds were short on both numbers and enthusiasm."

Coverage intensifies in final week

This over-confidence is further illustrated in the amount of attention the networks paid to the referendum. During the first three weeks of the official campaign there were 39 stories on the "National," "National Magazine," and "Sunday Report." On one night, the "National Magazine" was extended to one hour to report on the campaign. Averaging out the stories, CBC presented about 2 reports a night on the campaign during the first three weeks. Similarly, on CTV there were 58 stories during the first three weeks of October, which translates to almost three stories a night. However, during the final 8 days of the campaign, CBC presented 62 stories on the referendum and extended the "Magazine" twice, as well as extending "Sunday Report" to a full hour for referendum coverage. On October 26, 1995, the "National Magazine" devoted its entire time to allow Canadians outside Quebec to send messages to Quebecers, in essence providing an unpaid advertisement for the "No" campaign. This translated to an average of 7 stories a night on the referendum in the last week alone. Similarly, CTV also heightened its attention to the referendum, presenting 56 stories on it in the last 8 days of the campaign. On both networks, it appeared that nothing else was going on in the world except for the Quebec referendum.

TV presents a crisis

During the Meech Lake coverage, many people argued that by emphasizing the First Ministers' meetings to the extent that they did, that English-language television was responsible for creating a "crisis atmosphere." Further, this crisis atmosphere was orchestrated by the federal government. A similar strategy of creating a crisis was offered as a possible federal position in the referendum. In his October 26, 1995 report, Jason Moscovitz argued: "There are many who believe the federal government is trying to swat undecided Quebecers by creating a sense of crisis." He offered the following quote from political scientist Andre Blais as an example: "The federal government has an interest in, you know, putting the whole thing in some sort of crisis, dramatizing the event, telling Quebecers this is a very serious crisis; you have to be concerned about potential consequences. That's probably the best strategy they can adopt at this stage."

Contrast the positive attention paid to the federalist side during the initial weeks of the referendum campaign to the angst and language of reporters in the final days of the battle. On CBC, Mark Kelley reported on October 22: "Despite the sentiment, there are unmistakeable signs the federalist campaign is in trouble." Also on CBC on the same night, Tom Kennedy showed his shock at the turn of events: "Just two weeks ago, it didn't seem sovereignists could muster the support to put on a show like this. But now victory seems possible." On October 24, Peter Mansbridge even mentioned that the federalists campaign was running on a "fear effect."

CTV also emphasized the sense of crisis in its reports. Peter Murphy reported on the markets in his October 23 story: "The message from the markets has been clear and unequivocal. A `Yes' vote, a vote for separation, will exact a heavy economic cost, a cost borne not just by Quebecers, but by everyone in Canada."

On October 25, CTV's Roger Smith began his report on the prime minister's address to the nation with, "A desperate measure for desperate times." Smith continued his dire warnings on October 28 when he concluded his story with the following: "What happens after a close `Yes' vote is unchartered territory. A potential mine field of anger and confrontation that could challenge the Canadian tradition of pragmatic and peaceful compromise."

In his closing statement on "CTV News" on the eve of the referendum vote, Lloyd Robertson sounded this challenge to Quebecers: "So beginning in the morning, Quebec voters have to make that awful choice. Do they break up one country to form another? All of Canada is in their hands tonight."

To the extent that the crisis atmosphere helped or hindered the federal campaign will likely be argued for years. A report by Hugh Winsor in the November 11, 1995, Globe and Mail suggests that the outpouring of emotion from the rest of Canada which culminated in many Canadians travelling to Montreal for the big Unity rally may have helped the "Yes" forces. Nevertheless, the real question for media watchers is to what extent English-language television coverage was influenced by the federalist strategies.

Networks differ on certain aspects of referendum coverage

Notwithstanding the similar themes presented by the two national English-language television networks, there were some significant points of departure in their coverage of the referendum. As figure B shows, CBC spent much more time in its news stories reporting on the issues of the campaign than did CTV. On CBC, issue coverage comprised 62 percent of total attention, whereas on CTV, issues were presented in 49 percent of total coverage.

CTV gives economic consequences of separation more attention

On one particular issue, the economic consequences of Quebec separation, CBC and CTV provided significantly different coverage. Key to the debate on this issue was Finance Minister Paul Martin, who constantly warned about economic consequences of Quebec separation and also promised Quebecers that a "No" vote would not mean the continuation of the status quo. CBC provided just 21 of Mr. Martin's statements in over 50 days of television coverage. CTV gave Mr. Martin slightly more coverage, providing 29 of his statements over the seven week period.

For example, on September 26, 1995, both networks examined the financial arguments made by Mr. Martin. However, that was the only referendum story that night on CBC. CTV, on the other hand, ran a second story on the campaign about the impact of Bombardier's president campaigning on the "No" side.

Similarly, on September 12, 1995, while both networks talked about the potential gaffe of Lucienne Robillard--who said that in the hypothetical event of a Quebec "Yes" victory, the federal government would recognize an independent Quebec--CTV's story prior to that mini-scandal was one on the effects of a "Yes" vote. Lloyd Robertson introduced that story: "The people of Quebec heard a very bleak description today of what life would be like if the province separates from the rest of Canada. Liberal leader Daniel Johnson bluntly told Quebecers they can't rip Canada apart and expect to keep cherished links with the rest of the country."

On October 20, 1995, Paul Martin said that a "No" vote would indeed be a vote for changing the federation. CTV's Paula Newton stated: "The Finance Minister has been Ottawa's hardliner in this campaign, hammering separatists on the economics of their options. . . . But Martin is also acknowledging [that] the status quo just isn't good enough anymore." The network then showed a clip of Mr. Martin saying, "It is change that a "No" vote on the 30th of October guarantees."

Paula Newton ended her report with the statement: "But will that translate into the kind of change many Quebecers demand? Will it offer enough control, enough power? Many voters are asking themselves those questions, and convincing them that change is possible will be crucial for federalists in the coming week."

CBC down plays and challenges Martin's promise of change

In contrast, the focus of the CBC report was to down play and challenge Mr. Martin's promise for change. The CBC did not actually show Mr. Martin promising change. Instead they played a clip of him saying: "Canada has a history of change; it is change that meets the needs of the country."

Following this statement, CBC reporter Paul Adams questioned Martin's true intentions: "But when asked to explain, Martin's definition of change sounded a lot like a continuation of what Ottawa's already doing."

Paul Adams concluded his report with the statement: "With just ten days left in the campaign, the federalists say they have no intention of offering any new promises of constitutional change. As referendum day approaches, they hope voters will come to believe that their choice is a stark one between staying in Canada, or separating, and that they'll choose to stay."

Polls play a small part of coverage

Although the polls may have fuelled stories on the referendum, they were not given all that much in-depth play by the two networks. Only 3 percent of CBC and 7 percent of CTV attention reported on the polls or on the horse-race of the campaign.

Similarly, deconstructing the strategies was not given as much play on CBC as on CTV. Only 7 percent of CBC, but 22 percent of CTV total attention to the Referendum focused on the strategies of the "Yes" and "No" camps.

The networks also shied away from reports about the campaign trail, in contrast to the amount of attention such reports receive during elections. Only 10 percent of CBC and 13 percent of CTV coverage focused on this aspect of the referendum campaign.

"No" campaign statements and sources outnumber "Yes" campaign on English-language television coverage

Another way of assessing the referendum coverage is to look at the statements made by the leaders of the "Yes" and "No" camps. Between September 7, 1995 and October 29, 1995, over 1000 statements were made by these representatives on the CBC and CTV national news programs. All statements made in French which were directly translated by the reporter or visually translated on the television screen were included in the study.

Again, it was found that the English-language television coverage favoured the federalist position. The total number of statements made by leaders from the "No" camp outnumbered the "Yes" statements on both networks, as did the total number of "No" sources. This provided the federalists with greater opportunity to voice their opinions and arguments.

On CBC, a total of 450 statements were made by the leaders. Almost two-thirds of these statements originated from the "No" campaign, while only slightly over one-third of the statements came from the "Yes" campaign.

CTV provided more equitable coverage of the two camps. Fifty-five percent of the statements were from the "No" campaign, while 45 percent were from the "Yes" side. Interestingly, CTV provided more direct quotes from the leaders than CBC. Throughout the course of the study, CTV aired a total of 514 statements from leaders.

As table 1 shows, Daniel Johnson was the most-quoted source on CBC (90 statements), closely followed by Lucien Bouchard (89) and Jean Chretien (73). CTV focused its attention on Lucien Bouchard (122 statements), followed by Jean Chretien (87) and Jacques Parizeau (79). On CTV, only 69 quotes by Daniel Johnson were aired throughout the period of the study.

Francophone sources limited to leaders

In addition to providing more statements from the "No" campaign, both networks also offered a greater variety of sources originating from the "No" camp than from the "Yes" camp. CBC used more than three times as many sources from the "No" campaign than from the "Yes." Again, CTV was slightly more balanced, quoting from almost twice as many "No" sources as "Yes" sources. One possible explanation is that the reporters decided that direct or on-screen translations of French-speaking sources was not desirable. Whatever the reason, the end result was that the views from the "Yes" side were limited to the leaders; other representatives of the "Yes" camp went unheard in English Canada.

Click here to view: Sources used in 1995 Quebec Referendum Campaign September 7, 1995 - October 29, 1995

Networks focus on Bouchard throughout campaign

Another interesting feature of the English-language television coverage of the campaign was the networks' attention to Bloc Quebecois leader Lucien Bouchard. Statements made by Bouchard accounted for over one-half of CBC and CTV total "Yes" campaign statements originating from the leaders. In contrast, Parti Quebecois Leader Jacques Parizeau contributed only one-third of the "Yes" side statements.

However, not all of this coverage simply reported Bouchard's arguments for voting "Yes." Instead, the coverage focused on the controversial statements made by the sovereignists, such as Mr. Bouchard's statement to a rally of female voters that Quebecers are "one of the white races" with the lowest birth rates.

Networks fail to prepare Canadians for the possibility of a "Yes" vote

While the federalists were victorious in the eleventh hour, Canadians were not prepared for the possibility of a "Yes" vote for the first seven weeks of the campaign. This is partially attributable to the unbalanced coverage of the referendum campaign provided by the English-language television networks. By favouring the "No" arguments giving the federalists greater time to present their position, the networks lulled Canadians into a false sense of security. On October 23, 1995, when the Canadian dollar experienced the largest single day loss in three years, many people were astounded. From this point onward, the networks changed their tune entirely, and thus created a sense of crisis for Canadians outside of Quebec. Had the coverage been balanced from the beginning, and had English Canadian reporters accurately reflected the mood of voters and the separatist momentum in Quebec throughout the campaign, the crisis scenario might have been avoided. However, if, as Andre Blais argued, a crisis was in fact the best strategy for the "No" campaign, then the networks may have inadvertently been of great assistance to the federalists.

Summary of Findings on the Qubec Referendum

On the surface, the networks balanced their coverage of the "Yes" and "No" sides in the referendum campaign. CBC almost exactly balanced the amount of attention it paid to the sovereigntists and the federalists. CTV gave slightly more attention to the sovereigntists (56.2 percent).

English-language television actually favoured the "No" arguments. Excluding horse-race or campaign strategies, the coverage of the arguments for and against the referendum question clearly placed the English-language television networks in favour of the federalist campaign.

In the final week of the campaign, both networks presented a crisis atmosphere. From the dire predictions of the markets to the intensity of coverage, the networks helped to foster a tone of hysteria.

Methodology

Results are based on 64 "National" and 18 "Sunday Report" stories as well as 114 "CTV News" stories during the official referendum campaign, which commenced on October 1, and ended on October 29, 1995. The 19 "National Magazine" stories were excluded from the content analysis to ensure that the networks were compared on the same basis.

Results on the "unofficial campaign" are based on 26 CBC "National," 5 "Saturday Report" and 5 "Sunday Report" stories as well as 30 "CTV News" stories on the Quebec referendum from September 7 to September 30, 1995.

Further information on coding procedures may be obtained by contacting the National Media Archive.

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Last Modified: Wednesday, October 20, 1999.