Finally! Reforming Politics: The BC Blueprint
A Fraser Institute Conference,
November 22, 2001, Vancouver, BC, Canada
[Contents]
Selecting Representatives:
A Response to Nick Loene
ANDREW PETTER
Acting Dean, Faculty of Law
University of Victoria
Not for reproduction without the written permission of the author and The Fraser Institute
The Failings of FPTP
Let me say from the outset that I am substantially in agreement with Nick Loenen's analysis, particularly with respect to the failings of our current first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting system.
One of the things that have most impressed – and depressed – me in recent years is the extent to which our institutions of government at both the federal and provincial level have become disconnected from the people they seek to represent. Like Nick, I believe that FPTP is a big part of the problem. When one looks at the way FPTP works – or doesn't work – is it any wonder that citizens get the impression that their votes don't matter and that governments are unrepresentative of their interests?
The first-past-the-post system:
Systematically disenfranchises voters by "wasting" the votes of those casting ballots for candidates who do not finish first and "diminishing" the value of votes of those casting ballots for first place candidates who gain more votes than they require to be elected;
Creates legislatures that do not reflect the make-up of the electorate, conferring majority powers on parties that are supported by a minority of electors, and reducing or denying representation to those who support smaller parties;
Fosters one-party governments in which decision-making is centrally controlled and brokered behind closed doors (except in those rare instances of a minority or coalition government).
Exacerbates regionalism by divvying up representation based upon geographic rather than individual voting preferences.
For these reasons and more, I agree with Nick that FPTP is fundamentally unfair and undermines legislative accountability. I also agree with him that the remedy lies in adopting an electoral system in which there is greater proportionality between citizens' voting preferences and electoral results.
STV versus MMP
Where I differ from Nick is in my choice of mechanism to achieve this result. He favours a single transferable vote (STV) system based upon multi-seat districts. I believe that such a system is a second-best solution in that it requires too great a loss of local representation to achieve too little a gain in proportionality. As Nick himself concedes, STV produces "substantially proportional results" only with districts large enough to elect five or more MLAs, thereby severely compromising local representation. (Indeed true proportionality could only be guaranteed if there were one electoral district for the whole province.) On the other hand, if local representation were fully protected through the maintenance of single member constituencies, STV would become indistinguishable from an "alternative voting" (AV) system and produce results that Nick acknowledges are "as disproportional as FPTP".
The fact that STV entails a direct and inevitable trade-off between proportionality and local representation means that STV is likely to produce a system that fails on both fronts: one that has insufficient proportionality to overcome the deficiencies of FPTP while sacrificing too much local representation to satisfy the expectations of voters and local communities. Moreover the convoluted nature of the process through which votes are translated into seats under STV effectively makes the system less transparent and, in my view, would discourage public understanding of and confidence in the electoral system generally. (Say what you will about FPTP, it's easy to understand.)
I believe that these tradeoffs and costs are unnecessary. By moving to a mixed member proportional (MMP) system of the kind used in Germany, and recently adopted by New Zealand, Scotland and Wales, a greater degree of proportionality can be attained with less reduction in local representation.
Such a system would retain single member constituencies (albeit likely in somewhat reduced numbers), and would augment constituency representation with names chosen from party lists to produce a greater degree of proportionality between voters' party preferences and legislative representation. This system would certainly be more complex to administer than FPTP, but the process for translating votes into seats would be much more straight-forward than STV and would be relatively transparent and easy to understand.
MMP can also be designed to avoid most of the shortcomings ascribed to proportional representation systems. Appropriate minimal voting thresholds can be incorporated to prevent too great a degree of party proliferation; open party lists (i.e. allowing voters to select the candidates they favour from lists provided by parties) can be used to maximise voter choice and curb the power of political parties; and independent candidates can continue to run and be elected at the constituency level.
Legislative Reform, Political Inclusion and Stability
Having focused on the one major point of disagreement I have with Nick, I would like to focus on two of his many other points with which I am in full accord.
The first relates to the relationship between the electoral system and the functioning of legislative democracy. I wholeheartedly agree with Nick that "parliamentary reform can largely be accomplished through electoral reform." The reason for this is that parliamentary democracy – a system in which the legislature is supposed to hold the executive accountable on behalf of the public — has been subverted in Canada through the interaction of FPTP and party structures. This interaction has permitted a minority of voters to elect majority governments in which the Premier and cabinet control the legislative process, rather than the other way around. The result has been top-down decision-making made behind closed doors, in an environment that discourages public scrutiny and understanding of the difficult trade-offs involved in public policy making.
Electoral reform can go a long way to remedying this situation. A system that results in more proportional representation of parties in the legislature, in addition to being fairer, is more likely to produce minority or coalition governments that are less susceptible to one-party control, and are subject to a greater degree of legislative scrutiny and influence. Governments that depend upon multi-party support will necessarily be more open and inclusive in their decision-making. The result will be a policy-making process that is more transparent, and in which the public is better able to see and evaluate the issues at stake and trade-offs made.
A second point on which Nick and I agree relates to the desirability of having a governing structure that encourages greater political inclusion and stability. The polarised nature of British Columbia politics, with radical policy swings between left and right, may make for good entertainment, but it creates a political environment that is costly and detrimental to our long-term economic and social well-being. Yet this environment is as much a function of our electoral system as it is of our political culture. If our electoral system produced legislatures that more proportionally reflected the preferences of voters, governments would be forced to be more inclusive and to take account of and mediate amongst a broader range of views. Not only would such governments be more accountable, they would be required to produce policies that, by virtue of this process, would enjoy greater political legitimacy and be more likely to stand the test of time.
The Value of Political Pluralism
Let me offer one closing observation. There is no good reason why British Columbians should be afraid of a political system that encourages and reflects the multiplicity of views within our society. Political pluralism is a positive value that should be fostered, not feared, in our governance structures. I believe it was W.A.C. Bennett who, in explaining differences of opinion within his government, said: "When everyone thinks alike, no one thinks much at all." Whether he was being serious or not, "Wacky" was right. A political system that encourages a broad variety of views and perspectives — and requires governments to navigate amongst those views and perspectives — is likely not only to be more democratic, but also to yield better results.
For this reason, and the others canvassed in Nick Loenen's excellent paper, it's long past time that Canada and British Columbia joined the vast majority of the world's democracies in rejecting FPTP and in embracing a more proportional system of electoral representation.
[Contents]
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