Finally! Reforming Politics: The BC Blueprint

A Fraser Institute Conference,
November 22, 2001, Vancouver, BC, Canada

[Contents]

Freedom of the MP within a Party Structure

Ted White
MP, North Vancouver

Mr Chairman, Fellow Panelists, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would suspect that most, or perhaps all, of us here today know that reforming Parliament and the party structure in Canada to give MPs greater influence would definitely require a multi-faceted approach. 

In conferences over the years that I have been an MP I have most often spoken in broad terms about the contribution that direct democracy could make to such reforms.  My contribution today though focuses exclusively on the straitjacket of party control worn by Members of Parliament.  That straitjacket constricts them in the ways that they vote, make public comments, and express themselves in their speeches in the House itself.

As one of the very early members of the Reform Party I was anxious, as were a lot of those other early members, to find a way to address this problem. We tried to formulate a solution in policies designed to make MPs directly accountable to their constituents through citizens' initiatives, referendums, and recall.

In practical terms though, as we later discovered, controlling the power of the Leader is essential if MPs are going to be free to accurately represent their constituencies in a truly democratic fashion.

The Reform Party did adopt a very important, but little known, restriction on the power of the Leader, and it has worked well in terms of encouraging free votes by Reform, and now C.A., MPs. This control of the Leader did not, however, come without an internal struggle.

That struggle occurred back in 1988, when a very controversial and colourful columnist, the late Doug Collins, was chosen by the West Vancouver Reform Party Association to be their candidate for the 1988 election.

The Constitution of the Reform Party gave the sole right to choose a candidate to the members of the local association.  This rule had been included in the Constitution in order to prevent the Leader, or the Party administration, from parachuting in candidates or from directing the Association whom to choose.

The Leader of the Party at the time though, Preston Manning, was unhappy with the choice and announced that he would not sign the candidate nomination papers unless Doug agreed to a set of conditions in writing related to his controversial views.  Doug refused, so his papers were never signed, and a new candidate had to be chosen.

The local Riding Association was furious with Preston and made sure that Party members across the country recognized the Collins incident as highlighting a problem in the Party structure which we had not foreseen. 

I should make note at this time that under the provisions of the Canada Elections Act the Leader IS required to sign a candidate's nomination papers, so in a traditional party structure the Leader has absolute control over who becomes a candidate.

In the Reform Party though, a resolution was put forward at the Party convention following the Collins nomination. That resolution was adopted and changed the Party Constitution so that the Leader could not refuse to sign the nomination papers of any candidate who had been endorsed by a majority of National Council, which is the elected body of party members who are responsible for the running of the Party.

I have to say that this part of the Constitution has turned out to be somewhat empowering for incumbent Reform and C.A. MPs.  A number of observers believe, for example, that

Preston would have liked to have had some of the incumbent Reform and C.A. MPs replaced at the time of the 1997 and 2000 elections. 

The reasons why he may have wanted to see some of us replaced are of little relevance to this discussion.  Much more important is the fact that it was impossible for him to orchestrate such a change because Party members had made it clear to the National Council that they considered their incumbents to be doing a good job. National Council therefore voted to endorse the nominations and this forced the Leader to sign our papers.

Now clearly this is not a cure-all measure in terms of MP empowerment, because any MP wanting a political career, such as a major Critic role in opposition, or a ministerial appointment in Government, still needs to be careful not to upset the Leader.

But for those of us who are more interested in striving to accurately represent the will of our constituents, and who support significant changes to the political system in Canada, more than we want to be career politicians, this one tiny change to the Party Constitution protects us completely from removal by the Leader.

It leaves us free to vote in the House against the wishes of the Leader and/or caucus whenever we feel that it is justified and appropriate to do so.  It has also encouraged a culture within the caucus, INCLUSIVE of the Leader incidentally, which is very tolerant of such voting. In fact it is more than a TOLERANT culture because contrary voting, properly and logically justified, is fully ENCOURAGED. The only requirement is that there be reasonable evidence that an MP's constituents want him or her to vote against a majority caucus position.

Obviously today we are engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of SIGNIFICANT and COMPREHENSIVE measures which can be taken to improve the system, but what I wanted to illustrate in MY presentation was the important contribution which can flow from small changes in Party administrative practices.

Let me give another example.  In New Zealand the National Party Caucus selects its Leader from amongst the elected MPs.  There is then a regularly scheduled secret ballot of Caucus members - I believe it is at least once a month - to reaffirm confidence in the Leader.  As an MP friend of mine from NZ told me, a Leader who is losing the confidence of the Caucus cannot ignore the exponentially increasing numbers of NAY votes over two or three ballots and usually resigns before things become too embarrassing.

I have no doubt that a tiny change like this in the way our Canadian caucuses operate would significantly reduce the amount of power concentrated in the offices of the party leaders. Those nasty little secret ballots would ensure that the input from MPs was taken seriously, at least most of the time, otherwise discontent would quickly lead to a palace coup.

In closing let me say that although I strongly support the idea of a move from our present "First Past the Post" system to something more representative of the actual voting preferences of Canadians, I do not believe that such a change is necessary in order to get better and more accurate representation for the voters in Parliament.

I am convinced that accurate representation would flow automatically, regardless of the peculiarities of the electoral system, if minor changes, like those mentioned in this presentation, were made within the parties, and if voters had the power of citizens' initiated referenda and the right to recall their MPs.

In other words, self interest would ensure that MPs, and party leaders, did their jobs in a more representative manner, if their decisions could be over-ruled, and their careers ended, by the people who pay their salaries.

Ted White, MP
North Vancouver
November 22, 2001

[Contents]

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