Public Policy Sources 25:
Possible Causative Theory

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Thesis: The unjust conviction, dismissal, and denunciation of Donnelly were due in general to political correctness and to biases in favour of women and students.

Prior considerations

Generally, anti-harassment programs have been seen as feminist programs with the object of preventing powerful males from exploiting weaker females (particularly students). Although lip service was paid to other forms of harassment with the formal statements worded in a gender neutral way, it was still clear from many circumstances that this was the principal reason why anti-harassment programs were emphasized and supported.30

Indications from Policy

The Harassment Policy (HP) itself suggested an attitude that was pro-accuser. I have previously documented the numerous indications of bias in the policy itself (Finley, June 4, 1997). Here I will cite the section on sanctions:

10.1 The President shall impose an appropriate sanction for the harassment, may provide a remedy for the complainant, or may exonerate the respondent. The appropriate criterion for a decision in this process is "proof on a balance of probabilities," the standard in civil litigation. Considerations affecting administration action should include: the severity of the harassment; whether the harassment was intentional or unintentional; whether the offense is an isolated incident or involves repeated acts of harassment; mitigating or aggravating circumstances affecting either party.

10.2 The range of sanctions may include, but are not limited to: dismissal, expulsion, suspension, or public or private reprimand, depending on the seriousness of the offense and the respondent’s relationship with the University.

10.3 Where a complaint is found to be justified, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the complainant from any subsequent harassment, discrimination, or reprisal which might arise as a result of the complaint. Possible remedies may include written or oral apology, reassessment of academic work (e.g., examination, essay, thesis), or transfer out of a particular class or worksite. The President might also order a person to cease having any contact with the other party.

10.4 Where a complaint is found to be unjustified, the President may provide a remedy for the respondent. (SFU HP, Jan. 22, 1991, Sec. 10)

The way 10.2 follows 10.1 suggests that findings of harassment will be the normal result and that relief for the falsely accused is a relatively minor issue. The examples in 10.3 suggest that successful complainants will be students injured by their teachers. There are abundant sanctions for convicted defendants, but no sanctions for false accusers. Finally, not only does 10.4 appear as a terse afterthought, but the operative word is "may" in contrast to the "shall" of 10.1.

Comparison with Student Discipline Policy

Lest anyone think the apparent biases of the HP as implemented by Stubbs was normal to University discipline policies, it is useful to compare the HP to the student discipline policy (SFU Policy T10.03, Sept. 1, 1994). The difference is striking. Accused students have a number of important basic protections that were absent from the HP. Some notable examples follow.

The student discipline policy provides for a clear avenue of appeal and requires the President of the University to indicate and describe the right of appeal in the disciplinary letter (T10.03, 7.2). The HP had no such provision, and in many cases Stubbs omitted any reference to the possibility of appeals (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, docs. 6, 11, 13, 15).

The student discipline policy provides that penalties imposed by the President are not effective until an appeal is waived or has come down in the student’s disfavour (T10.03, 7.3). In contrast, Stubbs routinely implemented penalties and announced determination of guilt before appeals were heard, with the Donnelly case being a notable example.

The student discipline policy provides that only convictions can be appealed, whereas under the HP accused persons were not necessarily exonerated when the Panel found in their favour (SFU Policy T10.04, May 11, 1998; see "Attitude Toward Innocent Professor" below).

The student discipline policy appears to limit previous offenses from being brought up in the hearing until after guilt is determined (T10.03, 6.4), whereas under the HP, complainants were effectively allowed a virtually a free hand in attacking the character of the accused (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, docs. 14, 15; PR, p. 13).

The student discipline policy provides that witnesses are not allowed to hear other witnesses before testifying. In more than one case under the HP, this unfair practice was permitted. In at least one case, this arrangement severely compromised the rights of the accused (PR, pp. 17-18; SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, doc. 15, p. 6).

The student discipline policy provides that all hearings have to be audio-recorded for use in appeals (T10.03, 5.12). In the HP, this fundamental protection was conspicuous by its absence, and was seldom provided, even in major cases.31

Gender biases

In the 1994 to 1997 time period, all the Harassment Office employees were females. This includes the 7 different people employed by the office. In addition, both the people chosen to appoint Investigative Committees in 1997 were female. There were 6 sexual harassment cases (all of which had male defendants and female accusers) at SFU during the 1993 through 1996 time period. All 6 panels had female majorities. In all cases, the initial findings of the Panel were to convict the accused

males.32 In all these cases, substantial rewards for the complainants and major penalties for the accused were recommended.33

In the Donnelly case, the female preponderance posed dangers of prejudice against the accused. For obvious reasons, most women are more likely to see themselves as the victim of rape than as victims of false accusation of rape. Although such facts do not necessarily swamp judgment, it could be dangerous if combined with other biases, or if reinforced by prejudicial procedures.

In the PR, gender labelling is rife, despite serving no legitimate purpose. Since gratuitous attaching of gender appellations could reinforce gender prejudices, this practice suggests a lack of care in seeking neutrality. Scholarly writing removed gender appellations long ago. Newspapers and most legal writing also shun this prejudicial practice. Thus, it is indicative that this antiquated style was re-introduced in a setting where gender prejudice was a hazard.

Implementation biases

The Policy itself was bad enough, but Braha and Stubbs filled in gaps in such a way as to make things harder for the accused. Most of the protection provided to students in their disciplinary cases could have been provided to defendants in harassment cases, but Stubbs and Braha elected to omit them (see "Comparison with Student Discipline Policy" above). In addition, they imposed a purely arbitrary rule that in all appeals of Panel Reports, accusers would get two comment opportunities to the defendant’s one. They also put in a 2-to-1 majority rule criterion for conviction, rather than requiring a unanimous decision, when the Policy was silent on the issue (Braha, March 1997).

They contended that appeals should be mainly based on the premise that the Panel was right on the facts with no review of the actual evidence, even though such restriction was never stated in the Policy (Fournier, June 11, 1997). Stubbs further extended the disadvantages of the accused through special arrangements, such as having O’Hagan select the Panelists, attend the hearings, and advise the Panelists. None of these roles were authorized by the Policy, and one of these roles was expressly prohibited by the policy.34

Further, there was a process that selected on ideology. Panelists were chosen largely from friends, or friends of friends of Patricia O’Hagan.35 More often than not, these people had served as volunteer harassment counsellors. Thus, both direct selection and self-selection biases tended to choose Panelists who were more likely than average to be prejudiced against the accused.

Specific biases in Donnelly case

All three Panelists were selected by Patricia O’Hagan, who was biased in favour of Marsden. O’Hagan would have been well aware of the Panelists’ attitudes, and the past form of Sandra Eix,36 which did not bode well for males accused of sexual harassment. In addition, both Lou Hafer and Eix had been volunteer harassment policy advisors, so the process resembled selecting juries from among the police auxiliary.

Attitude of Thea Hinds

The third Panelist was Thea Hinds, whose ideological proclivities are well known.37 Her attitude is best indicated by her description of the determination of guilt. First, we have Thea Hinds instructing us on how legal systems work:

The aggrieved parties have the same footing whether they are involved in a civil, criminal, or a harassment case. In each scenario, the onus is on the respondent to defend herself/himself. (Hinds, Sept. 29, 1997)

Some people pointed out that Hinds really did not have things quite right, at least in this part of the world. But let us continue. One person answered the above statement by addressing how courts often proceed when a defendant refuses to partici-pate:

False. Normally when a person chooses not to defend himself/herself, the court appoints a "friend of the court" to do so. The constitutional case involving Canada and Quebec’s right to secede is a perfect example of this. Quebec refused to participate. The court appointed a lawyer to act in Quebec’s interest. As far as I know, the Harassment Panel did no such thing, and they should be ashamed they did not. (Shuck, e-mail, Sept. 29, 1997)

To any person remotely having the requisite abilities to judge others, the above statement should be lucid enough. The writer is saying the Panel should have appointed someone to act as an advocate for Donnelly. The Panel clearly did not do this, nor does the PR indicate that the idea was even considered. Hence, the only question is whether the Panel should have done this. Yet after quoting the above statement from Shuck, Hinds replied as follows:

FALSE. There were repeated written attempts to obtain "participation" from several individuals. The assumptions that some faculty make about what and what did not occur and what was and was not said, are really quite astounding! An apology would be nice, but I won’t expect one. Thea (Sept. 30, 1997)

The above statement reveals nothing about the issue at hand, but it indeed reveals all we need to know about the abilities and attitude of Thea Hinds and the selection criteria for Panel members. Her statement also indicates the sort of abuse that Donnelly might have encountered had he made the mistake of dignifying the Panel hearings with his presence.

Social Views of Panel

In attempting to address the question of jurisdiction, the Panel treats us to their perception of the University, and the employees’ responsibility to SFU:

By daily example, the University attempts to convey to all who work and study here that being a member of the University community is to be taken in the sense of membership in a civic and professional community, in opposition to any notion of a strict employer/employee/client relationship. One has only to participate in the daily process of University life to see that consultation is widespread, with an effort made to include all members of the community. With this notion of civic membership and rights there is also a notion of responsibility, in the sense that the members of the community are expected to act in a way that reflects well on the University. (PR, p. 6)

The whole tenor of the above remarks reflects an attitude that most faculty, staff, and students would never endorse as a disciplinary precept. Few professors would ever write such drivel. More important, no faculty association or union would ever agree to such an open invitation to 24-hour monitoring as this. The Panel fails to cite the policy endorsing such a mandate, possibly because there is no such policy. According to the Panel, these are self-evident truths. The statement tells us far more about the vapid ideologies of three specially-selected panelists than about protocols governing university relationships.

Attitude of Lou Hafer

Some of Hafer’s comments that illuminate his thought processes are given in the following interview report by Marina Jimenez:

The panel has also been criticized for its lack of knowledge about administrative law. Hafer, however, said panel members were advised by Anita Braha, SFU’s lawyer, and by Dr. Patricia O’Hagan, the harassment coordinator at the time. "There’s a notion that we were people ignorant of the rules, proceeding blindly," Hafer said. "In fact, we had good, sound advice on policy and the principles of natural justice." He said his training as a scientist helped him form and test theories, weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. (July 3, 1997)

Just how Hafer could evaluate the soundness of the advice received, not being an expert in the areas himself, is (like so many of his leaps and bounds) unexplained. The comment about his training as a scientist helping him is utter rubbish in light of what was actually done. The PR is so patently unscientific that the statement by Hafer appears to be shameless puffery.

These statements were made before O’Hagan’s partisanship was announced. Once this was revealed, being advised by her was no longer a boon, and we failed to hear any more as to how the Panel benefited from her wisdom. O’Hagan herself later claimed that she never advised the Panel at all (Oct. 18, 1997). One wonders which of the two truths our true believers now believe.

Attitude of John Stubbs

Prior Indications

Despite Stubbs having a generally good reputation in the academic community, there were a number of public indications prior to the Donnelly case that suggest that Stubbs held extreme views on the issue of harassment. This was indicated by the following actions:

1. Proposing (at his previous university) policies based on the so-called "zero-tolerance" doctrine with its enthronement of fanaticism, which proposals were met with strong (and successful) faculty opposition (Lee, Jimenez, and Goldhar, July 16, 1997).

2. Proposing in 1994 to make the SFU Harassment Policy even more onerous by making up new offenses, inserting more ideology, and eliminating remedies for respondents, while retaining the lack of penalties for false complaints (Stubbs, Mar. 8, 1994).38

3. Dismissing an employee with cause for alleged spouse abuse, based on evidence that not only failed to meet judicial scrutiny, but inspired judicial mirth (Williamson, May 1, 1996).

4. Arbitrarily disciplining a professor for an "offense" that was a lawful exercise of free speech violating no SFU rule (Cole, Feb. 6, 1997).

Such actions suggest that Stubbs was a zealot in this area. We will next see that attitudes reflected in his opinions indicate this tendency.

An Early Revealing Comment

In a relatively simple early case, a Panel found that the complaint was unmerited, and gave no indication that the respondent had done anything wrong at all. Yet Stubbs wrote the following in his review letter:

I appreciate the time and energy you [the complainant] spent having your complaint heard through the Harassment Policy. I take harassment as a very serious issue that requires the University to take pro-active steps to stop and prevent harassment from occurring on campus. Thank you for bringing your complaint forward to the Harassment Office and I would like to express my regret that your experience of Simon Fraser has been negatively affected. (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, doc. 2, pp. 1-2)

I will mercifully ignore the literary qualities of the above and ask what went on here. Although this Panel found no evidence of harassment, Stubbs still felt obliged to apologize to the complainant. Such abasement for acquitting the accused was inappropriate and in stark contrast to the hostility that Stubbs usually showed towards accused persons.

Posturing in Opinions

Despite his role as judge with an obligation to be fair, Stubbs made the following statement within the realm of the 11 cases:

I wish to make it very clear that I do not condone harassment of any kind and that I take the University’s responsibility to endeavour to provide a harassment-free environment as a matter of the highest priority. I expect all members of the University community to comply with their obligations under the University’s Harassment Policy. (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, doc. 11, p. 4)

Stubbs was so proud of this prose that he used it verbatim two other times (always when handing out a big penalty), with the last being the Donnelly case (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, docs. 15, 21). The problem is not merely the vapidity, but the utter lack of judiciousness. Stubbs was acting in a role that should emphasize fairness over zeal. If one goal should have transcended others, it should have been the goal of protecting the rights of the accused. We never find Stubbs proclaiming that he "does not condone unfairness to the accused of any kind." The contrast indicates the reversal of priorities wherein political correctness becomes a brief for tyranny.

Attitude Towards Innocent Professor

Another case demonstrates how biased Stubbs was against professors accused by students (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, docs. 18, 19). In this instance, a professor accused of prejudice was cleared by the Panel assigned to her case. In real courts, the matter would have been over, since only convictions can be appealed. Also, as has been noted previously, students charged with disciplinary offenses enjoy this protection, which is found in most civilized judicial systems.

Stubbs acted as follows. First, he delayed transmittal of the Report for 5 weeks without giving any reason. Then he proposed 3 more submittals, two from the complainant and one from the respondent, after which he would make up his mind. This was not a procedure mandated by the policy, but was a procedure invented by Braha and Stubbs.

The professor then protested about being subjected to further delays after being cleared by the Panel. She also criticized certain pro-accuser provisions of the policy. She indicated that she had already answered all charges, had cooperated fully, and had nothing to add to the Panel’s findings. Despite her obvious chagrin, her critical comments were restrained with no hectoring.

Stubbs counted this as the professor’s response. According to his own procedures specified in his letter, the student was to have one week to respond, whereupon Stubbs would render his decision. By responding quickly and not waiting for the student’s first comments, the professor had expedited the procedure. Stubbs should have been able to wrap up the case within a couple of weeks of the time from which the professor submitted her response.

This was not to be. The student’s reply came in 9 weeks after the professor’s response, which Stubbs found acceptable. But this was not all. The student had criticized Patricia O’Hagan, so Stubbs decided he had to obtain a formal response from O’Hagan, which took 3 months from the time of the student’s first comments. Stubbs then decided the student could respond to O’Hagan’s response, which tacked on another 4 weeks. Then Stubbs took another 6 weeks to exonerate the professor.

This professor had been put through a long and awful experience through no fault of her own. The whole concept that acquittals can be overturned based on administrative blunders is so wrong that even to subject the professor to this possibility was immoral. Yet more was to come. Although he exonerated the respondent on the charges, Stubbs had the following to say:

My task in arriving at this decision was made more difficult by the refusal of [the professor] to participate in the process I established to receive submissions from the parties. Although, I appreciate that parties may feel they are engaged in a process against their will, I am disappointed by the tenor and content of [the professor]’s response to this process. I expect more respect for these processes from members of the University community. (SFU FOI, Sept. 3, 1998, doc. 19, p. 7)

On top of everything else, his factual premises are entirely wrong. One can easily trace through the record that the entire seven-month delay from the Panel’s findings of innocence to the official decision by Stubbs was produced by delays caused by the complainant, by O’Hagan, and by Stubbs himself.39 His statement was an unmerited gratuitous insult, designed to punish a defenceless professor for criticizing his implementation of the anti-harassment program.

Moreover, Stubbs then refused to award the professor her legal fees.40 Not only this, but aside from the formal exoneration, Stubbs had nothing good to say about a professor who deserved both sympathy and praise for resisting pressure from a student trying to strong-arm a grade change. This attitude is in marked contrast with his generosity to successful student complainants. Despite her integrity, the professor was perceived as being politically incorrect, which Stubbs saw as a legitimate reason to increase her suffering.

Pattern of Behaviour

We see that complainants were indulged even when their complaints were without merit. In contrast, respondents were treated as enemies. Gratuitous posturing replaced analysis and judiciousness. A professor who had been found innocent was castigated wrongfully and gratuitously for her supposed poor attitude. Such actions were not merely mistakes or normal judgment errors, but are indications that Stubbs’s ability to judge fairly was severely blighted by ideology.

Biases of Braha

Anita Braha is known for her feminist advocacy (Clark, July 13, 1997). She came to BC from Ontario where her main claim to fame was making a huge case of attacking a professor who had allegedly ogled a female swimmer. In BC she was best known as a major promoter and strident advocate of the since-discredited McEwen Report (Nuttal-Smith, July 31, 1995; Steffenhagen, Nov. 5, 1998). She has also been involved in various organizations that promote changing the legal system to become more receptive to their version of feminism. She is a regular contributor to the Bill Black Reports, NDP planning documents in the so-called "Human Rights" area.

Although such activities are within her rights, her background is one that should give a male swim coach considerable pause if he is looking for objective treatment in a harassment complaint made by a female swimmer. There is no indication that Braha ever advocated for a male accused of sexual harassment in any kind of dispute. Although a person with her background could possibly adapt to a neutral role, the risks of bias would be greater than normal.

More important, there is considerable evidence that Braha’s ideology actually did translate to unfairness in practice. The first line of evidence is her involvement in the actions described earlier in this study, where a lawyer, more than other people, should have known better. Four general indications of bias are:

1. Her outlandish rules of evidence that were greatly to Marsden’s advantage (see "Presentation and Analysis of Panel Text" above).

2. Her admission of outrageously prejudicial material, which would never be condoned were the gender roles reversed (see the "Prejudicial Material" section, in particular, "Class Guilt" and "Anything Goes" subheadings).

3. Her sanctioning of such irregular and unfair procedures as allowing Marsden to introduce new charges throughout the hearings.

4. Her advice and participation in covering up the problems with the behaviours of O’Hagan and Marsden as described earlier.

Braha’s press conference advocacy

A second major line of evidence of Braha’s bias is her comments to the press shortly after the case became public. As advisor to the Panel and advisor to Stubbs in his judicial role, she had an ethical duty to treat Donnelly fairly. Yet a lack of fairness on each major issue can be shown, based on the Vancouver Sun article on SFU’s June 5, 1997 press conference (Jimenez, June 6, 1997) and her own article (Braha, June 6, 1997).

Determination of Donnelly’s Guilt

Braha knowingly overstated the extent, care, and reliability of the case against Donnelly. Some specific indications of her extreme partisanship were:

1. Generalized glossing on Marsden’s truthfulness and good faith, despite the known problems in this area.

2. Hiding a possible monetary motive by participating in an effort to deceive the public on the $12,000 payment to Marsden (Bula, June 7, 1997; Jimenez, June 11, 1997).

3. Exaggerating the importance of testimony under oath without mentioning such obvious limitations as no penalties for false claims and the lack of transcripts.

4. Claiming the use of "rules of evidence," which was sheer puffery in light of the actual evidence used and her lack of any reference to an appropriate standard.

5. Claiming Marsden’s evidence had been tested by oral testimony and examination under oath while ignoring that this was untrue for some of the charges for which Donnelly was convicted.

Rejection of Donnelly’s Arguments

Braha promoted dubious reasons for excluding and ignoring Donnelly’s evidence. Some examples were:

1. Attacking Donnelly for presenting evidence to the public when, in fact, Donnelly had gone public only after both SFU and Marsden had publicly assailed him four days earlier.41

2. Claiming that Donnelly’s evidence was untested, while ignoring that significant portions of this evidence had been admitted to by Marsden and thus required no such testing.

3. Overemphasizing Donnelly’s non-participation as if it were the transcendent issue.

4. Failing to reveal the problems with the formation of the Panel, which were grounds for a new set of hearings during which Donnelly’s evidence could be validly presented.

5. Giving the false impression that Donnelly had been notified of all the charges against him, which was clearly not the case.

Braha’s Description of Procedures

Here Braha and SFU tried to give the public the impression that procedures and safeguards were better and more consultative than they really were. Some examples are the following.

1. Stating, "As you can see, the university follows an extremely judicial approach to the hearing of these complaints" (Braha, June 6, 1997), yet providing no evidence that crucial elements were judicial at all. This quotation tells us more about the audacity of Braha than about the process.

2. Touting the post Panel Report submission procedures while failing to mention that major anomalies had occurred in this particular case (see "Advance Distribution to Marsden," and "Private Correspondence" above).

3. Implying that Panel selection procedures were unbiased, even though members had been chosen by a person whom Marsden had styled the same year as her "best friend."

4. Arranging for Gregg MacDonald, a male executive, to be the SFU spokesperson, when in fact he had no real knowledge as to what had occurred.

Hearsay Testimony

In marked contrast to the practices of real courts and labour arbitrations, Braha allowed extreme and abundant uses of hearsay evidence. Nevertheless, Braha asserted that Donnelly’s evidence was inherently inferior because: (a) his sources were not under oath before the Panel; (b) his sources were not examined by the Panel; and (c) his sources did not have their demeanours observed.42 Yet in hearsay testimony: (a) the sources are not under oath; (b) the sources are not examined, and (c) the sources do not have their demeanours observed. If Braha believed that these features were essential, she should have banned hearsay evidence. Her failure to do this indicates that these three reasons for excluding Donnelly’s evidence were not genuine.43

Importance of Cross-Examination of Witnesses

Braha misled the public on the issue of cross-examination of witnesses. According to the Vancouver Sun

But SFU lawyer Anita Braha said Donnelly’s submissions were not presented during the campus hearing, and therefore can’t be considered official evidence. Donnelly was not sworn in and cross-examined, the way Marsden and her witnesses were. (Jimenez, June 6, 1997)

If Braha actually said this, she was simply lying, since Marsden and her witnesses were never cross-examined. Even if the above paraphrase is not quite right, Braha did say:

Mr. Donnelly has not been subjected to cross-examination; the investigating committee has not been able to question Mr. Donnelly and assess his demeanour and his credibility in the way it did with the complainant. (June 6, 1997)

Although not an outright lie, the above statement seems crafted to leave the false impression that Marsden was cross-examined. Braha often referred to Donnelly’s evidence not having been "cross-examined," while frequently referring to Marsden’s evidence having met the test of "examination" (Braha, June 6, 1997; SFU News, June 19, 1997), even though, as explained earlier, in some instances the Panel merely read and ratified the charges.

Summation of Braha’s Actions

Braha’s abundant and palpable lack of neutrality suggests that she had supported Marsden throughout the case. The most plausible explanation for this bias is that it conformed to her ideology that Donnelly should be guilty. Thus she set out to help "prove" that he was guilty. Given her control and the biased selection of lay panelists, this was easy to do, at least to their satisfaction and that of Stubbs.

One of the ironies was the contrast between Braha and Somjen, who acted as advocate for SFU in the arbitration and mediation. As an advocate, Somjen had less ethical obligation to act fairly to Donnelly, yet he nevertheless exhibited far greater fairness than Braha, who was supposed to be unbiased. Despite her obligation to be neutral, Braha not only acted in essence as a brief for Marsden, but she often exceeded even the bounds of fairness for an advocate.

Cumulative effect

Unrestrained zealotry was the etiologic force in the Liam Donnelly case. This explains why an ideologue like Braha was given such unchecked power, and why a Thea Hinds could be deemed fit to judge others. Those involved believed that their devotion to the cause guaranteed results to such a degree that normal checking and consulting should be eliminated. Political correctness superseded the values that would normally have prevented the debacle from occurring.

The six people involved-- Braha, Eix, Hafer, Hinds, O’Hagan, and Stubbs-- believed Donnelly to be guilty because it fit their ideology that he should be guilty. Consequently, no one looked at the actual evidence with careful and unprejudiced consideration. They failed to notice the absence of evidence in key areas, because they all wore the same blinders. Being true believers in a common ideology, they failed to produce the healthy clash of ideas that would have revealed the multitude of problems with the case.

The organization had much in common with the "star chamber": the recruitment of friends, the exploitation of secrecy, the concentration of power, and the perception that loyalty to the program was the greatest good. The success of the program was to be measured by its effectiveness in nailing supposed harassers. This was in marked contrast to the open process with checks and balances needed to ensure that false convictions were not pushed through the system.

John Stubbs failed to note the dangers of Braha’s biases because he shared them. He endorsed the Panel Report out of his blind faith in the products of this holy program. Because of his ideological blight, he failed to see what Marsden saw clearly: that the program was ideologically driven and that those involved were pushovers for anything that stroked their ideology.

But it got worse. When Stubbs learned that O’Hagan had acted improperly and Marsden irrationally, his principal concern was to cover up the problems. When he learned that the Panels had been illegally appointed, his reaction was to protect the cause by concealing the anomalies. This case refutes claims that anti-harassment programs are benign. Far from being a myth, political correctness is alive and is extremely dangerous to those innocent people whom the zealots perceive as enemies.

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