Shifting Priorities: From Deficit Spending to Paying down the Debt and Lowering Taxes - Evidence from the Alberta Advantage Surveys: 1995-2000

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Lessons From the "Ralph Party" in Alberta

The conventional Downsian theory of government decision-making recommends that in order to sustain popular support, governments must implement a balanced mix of spending and financing designed to maximize voter support and minimize the number of votes lost. This means, therefore, that to increase support, governments have one of two choices: they can either increase spending or decrease taxing. The case of the Klein government in Alberta, however, suggests that governments need not feel so constrained; the "balanced" approach is not the only approach. It is also possible, for example, for a government to grow in popularity despite having drastically cut spending on core programs without having reduced taxes.

Downs’ theory significantly underplays the ability of governments to shape the opinion of electorates through priming and agenda-setting. Popular success the "unbalanced" way, though perhaps arduous, is not impossible, Johnston and his colleagues argued, if parties "make noise to get noticed," and if they do so with sufficient skill. By so doing they "simplify the cognitive task confronting voters and give voters reasons for supporting them" (1992:249).

As noted above, Albertans did not miraculously wake up one morning deeply concerned about the province’s finances. Nor were they infected with a perverse political virus that rendered them immune to the impact of paying the same taxes but receiving reduced services. On the contrary, by continuously pointing out its significance for debt reduction and overall economic prosperity, the Klein Government tried deliberately to persuade Albertans of the importance of deficit elimination. The Alberta Tories were helped by the Decore Liberals, and by the federal Reform Party, both of which had been advocating the need for governments to be more fiscally prudent, effective and less intrusive, but this indicates only that the Klein government took advantage of circumstantial opportunities. The result was an electorate purposely primed for one particular policy more than any other.

It is important to note, however, that priming and preference-shaping are not simply exercises in public relations. In a democracy governments must at some point appeal to evidence and to argument. In this respect, the Klein government was also rhetorically adept. It was able successfully to build both a consensus of intensities—on the need to eliminate the deficit—and a consensus of views—that the best way to do it was by cutting expenditures, and not by increasing taxes. By so doing, the Tories gave Albertans a reason to vote for them.

The importance of consensus-building is evident in that committed majorities provide the strongest political support. In democracies, commitment is enhanced by an appeal to reason and common-sense. Our data show that voters are capable of reasoning and responding to plausible arguments. They priortized their policy preferences and categorized certain issues as being more important than others. Regardless of criticisms from the opposition and despite growing concerns over both the pace and magnitude of the budget cuts, most Albertans continued to support the Klein government because they overwhelmingly supported the long-term goal of deficit reduction. The potential benefits were judged to be worth the actual disruption. Moreover, Conservatives were successful in convincing Albertans that they were the party that proposed the most reasonable policies and had the most comprehensive plan to deal with a difficult but manageable problem. On this point, it may no longer be enough for a party always to rely on their long-term sociological and psychologically-based ties, especially during difficult times.

Once the restructuring program was underway it then became possible to make more of a performance-based appeal. By 1995 it was evident that the focal point of the party’s strategy would be the premier himself. Above all else, Albertans continue to support the Tories because they like the man in charge. Indeed, in order for the government’s strategy to work, Albertans had to trust the premier—and they did, far more than they trusted the opposition leader. He led by example. Indeed, when Albertans think of their premier, they think of someone with integrity, someone who listens, keeps his word, and admits mistakes. Against the backdrop of a widespread decline in public trust for politicians, the fact that the Premier is an effective politician and competent administrator or that he successfully eliminated the deficit, is clearly secondary.

Of course, any campaign based entirely on a leader-centred strategy, with no priming, no issues, and no long-term agenda would carry with it a number of significant risks. After all, the Downsian expectations cannot be defied forever: if there is no gain and only pain, no elected government, even with a popular leader, can long remain in office. Furthermore, it is also necessary to have a plan for dealing with the opposition. Machiavelli once advised the new prince to learn to imitate both the lion and the fox. The Klein government was leonine in its confrontation with its opponents outside the legislature—particularly public sector unions—and foxy with respect to its opponents inside the chamber. Indeed, they began prior to the 1993 election by stealing the Liberal’s chief criticism of the Getty government and making it their own, much as the federal Liberal party did with respect to Reform/Alliance toward the end of the decade. The declining support for both the provincial Liberals and for Nancy MacBeth indicates that the government has succeeded in creating a less adversarial environment within which to implement its unconventional approach. Had the opposition parties and leaders been more effective, the chances are likely that the opposing forces would also have been much stronger.

Finally, the government has succeeded in taking advantage of contingencies, and turned them into benefits. Albertans have prospered because of a buoyant economy. But this effect can easily be overstated. After all, the economy was far from robust in 1993 when the Klein government was first elected on an agenda of deficit reduction and spending cuts. Yet every government likes to take responsibility for good economic times and the Klein government is no different. Perhaps more important, however, is that a strong economy and a strong revenue stream provide an innovative government with the flexibility to try something new and to fix the inevitable mistakes or dampen the transition costs.

A second category of contingency that the government has used to its advantage is to emphasize the leadership of Alberta as a province. It is clear that on the issue of fiscal responsibility the federal government and the other provinces followed the lead of Alberta. It is also clear that, in many instances Alberta’s leadership was resented. Whether on the issue of fiscal federalism and inter-regional fiscal transfers or changing the assumptions surrounding the Canada Health Act, when the Alberta government was criticized by federal politicians or premiers from other provinces the government of Alberta has been quick to react, knowing that by so doing it stands to benefit politically from a surge in popular support. The criticism by federal health minister Allan Rock of the government over Bill 11 for example, was quickly turned by the Klein government into a sign of disrespect for the province as a whole. Likewise the premier’s angry response to the Prime Minister over Rock’s criticism was used successfully to mobilize additional support for the government.

Beyond an ability to take advantage of opportunities, which is hardly a unique capacity, the Klein government is unusual for having introduced, albeit indirectly, the issue of virtue into political debate in the province. The virtues promoted by a policy that condemned borrowing yourself into debt and advocated a policy of saving yourself into prosperity, are prudence and responsibility. Klein’s cheerfulness is not simply the result of the happy knowledge that his opponents are weak, but flows as well from an understanding that Albertans would be better, and not just better off, with less government.

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